1756 - Issue: He said: "And making it obligatory is by saying: 'This is an animal for sacrifice (udhiyya)'."

The entirety of this matter is that which makes an animal for sacrifice obligatory and specifies it is the verbal statement, not the intention. This is the explicit statement of al-Shafi'i. Malik and Abu Hanifa said: If he buys a sheep or other animal with the intention of sacrifice, it becomes an animal for sacrifice, because he is commanded to purchase an animal for sacrifice, so if he buys it with that intention, it fulfills it, like an agent. Our evidence is that it is a divestment of ownership for the sake of an act of piety, so an intention concurrent with the purchase does not affect it, just like manumission (itq) and endowment (waqf). It differs from a sale, as he cannot assign it to his principal after concluding it, whereas here, after the purchase, he can designate it as an animal for sacrifice. As for when he says, "This is an animal for sacrifice," it becomes obligatory, just as a slave becomes free by his master's saying, "This is free." If he puts a garland on it or marks it (ish'ar) intending by that to make it an animal for sacrifice, it does not become an animal for sacrifice until he speaks the words, for the reason we have mentioned.

1757 - Issue: He said: "And if he makes it obligatory while it is defective, he shall slaughter it, but it will not suffice him."

This means if it is defective to a degree that prevents it from sufficing, and he makes it obligatory, he is obligated to slaughter it because making it obligatory is like a vow to slaughter it, so he must fulfill it. Furthermore, making it obligatory is like a vow to offer an animal for sacrifice from other than the cattle class (bahimat al-an'am), where he is obligated to fulfill it, yet it does not suffice for the legal sacrifice, nor is it considered a proper animal for sacrifice, per the statement of the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace): "There are four that do not suffice in sacrifices." However, he shall slaughter it, and he will be rewarded for what he gives in charity from it, just as one is rewarded for charity in what is not suitable to be a sacrificial offering, and just as if he emancipated a slave for his expiation who does not suffice for the expiation. However, he is not obligated here to provide a replacement, because the animal for sacrifice is not originally obligatory, and he did not do anything that would make it so. If the animal for sacrifice was obligatory upon him, such as one who vows a sacrifice as a liability upon himself or destroys the animal he had made obligatory, this [defective one] will not suffice for what is his liability. If its defect ceases—for instance, if it was emaciated and the emaciation ceased, or it was sick and it recovered, or it was lame and the lameness ceased—the Qadi said: The analogy of the school is that it suffices.