This was mentioned by the Qadi and Abu al-Khattab, because its existence is conceivable. If one swears to it, his oath is binding, and the expiation is immediately due from him because he is despairing of fulfilling it, so the expiation becomes incumbent, just as if he swore to divorce his wife and she died.

The second type is the logically impossible, such as reversing yesterday or drinking water that is in a jug when there is no water in it. Abu al-Khattab said: 'His oath is not binding, and no expiation is due for it.' This is the school of Malik, because it is an oath accompanied by that which invalidates it, so it does not become binding, like the lying oath (yamin al-ghamous), or it is an oath regarding that which is not conceivable, so it resembles the lying oath. This is because an oath is only binding regarding that which is conceivable or imagined to be conceivable, and neither is the case here. The Qadi said: 'It is binding and necessitates expiation immediately.' This is the opinion of Abu Yusuf and al-Shafi'i, because he has sworn to his own action in the future and has not done it, just as if he swore to divorce his wife and she died before he divorced her, and by analogy to that which is impossible by custom. There is no difference between his knowing its impossibility or not knowing it, such as if he swears to drink the water in the jug while there is no water in it; the ruling is the same for one who knows there is no water in it and one who does not.

If he swears to kill a certain person, and that person is dead, then it is (35) like that which is impossible by custom, because it is conceivable that Allah could revive him so he could kill him, and his oath is binding according to the view of our companions. If he swears, 'I will kill the dead person,' meaning during the state of his death, it is logically impossible, so it contains the disagreement we have already mentioned.

Section: If he says, 'By Allah, so-and-so will do such-and-such,' or 'will not do it,' or he swears regarding someone present, saying, 'By Allah, you will do such-and-such,' and he causes him to break it, and he does not do it, then the expiation is upon the one who swore. This is what Ibn Umar, the people of Medina, 'Ata', Qatada, al-Awza'i, the people of Iraq, and al-Shafi'i stated, because the one who swore is the one who caused the breach, so the expiation is upon him, just as if he were the actor who caused the breach. Furthermore, the cause of the expiation is either the oath, or (36) the breach, or both; whichever of these is considered, it is found in the one who swore. If he says, 'I ask you by Allah to do such-and-such,' and he intends an oath, then it is like the one before it. If he intends to intercede with him by Allah, it is not an oath, and there is no expiation for either of them. If he says, 'By Allah, you will do such-and-such,' it is an oath, because he has answered with the response of an oath, unless he intends that which diverts it. If he says, 'By Allah, I will do,' it is not an oath, because he did not answer it with the response of an oath.