with property, there are two narrations; one of them is that it is permissible for him to perform expiation with it. The other is that it is not permissible except by fasting. We have already mentioned the reasons for this in [the section on] Zihar, and the difference of opinion regarding it. Al-Qadi stated that the root of this, in his view, is the two narrations regarding a slave's ownership by transfer of ownership (tamlik). If we say: He owns by transfer of ownership, and his master transferred ownership to him and gave him permission to perform expiation with property, it is permissible because he is the owner of what he is performing the expiation with. And if we say: He does not own by transfer of ownership, then his obligation is fasting, because he does not own anything with which he could perform expiation. Likewise, if we say: He does own [by transfer], yet his master did not give him permission [to perform the expiation with property], then his obligation is fasting, even if he owns, because he is under interdiction (mahjur) and is prohibited from disposing of what is in his possession. He said: Our companions establish two narrations regarding the slave, absolutely, whether we say he owns or does not own. Then, according to the narration that permits him to perform expiation with property, does he have the right to provide food, and does he have the right to emancipate a slave? There are two narrations: one of them is that he does not have that right, because emancipation necessitates wala' (patronage), wilayah (guardianship), and inheritance, and the slave does not possess that, so he [only] performs expiation by providing food. This is a narration on the authority of Malik, and it is the view of Al-Shafi'i, according to the opinion that permits him to perform expiation with property. The second is that he has the right to perform expiation by emancipation, because whoever is permitted to perform expiation with property is permitted to do so by emancipation, like the free person; and because he owns the slave, his expiation by emancipating him is valid, like the free person. Regarding their statement that emancipation necessitates wala' and wilayah, we do not concede that in the case of emancipation for expiation, as we have mentioned previously. Even if we were to concede it, the absence of some legal consequences does not prevent the establishment of the effective cause (muqtadi), for the ruling is absent due to the absence of its condition, not the absence of its legal consequences, just as it is established due to the existence of its condition. Furthermore, the absence of some legal consequences while the effective cause exists only occurs due to an impediment (mani') that prevents them, and it is possible that the impediment is specific to them without others. For this reason, the effective cause that necessitates these rulings is not prevented from being established by their absence in the case of a slave. Moreover, wala' is established by the slave's emancipation, but he does not inherit through it, just as if their religions were different. This is the choice of Abu Bakr, who derived from it that if his master gave him permission and he emancipated himself, there are two opinions regarding it: one is that it suffices him, because it is a person that would suffice for someone else, so it suffices for himself like anyone else. The other is that it does not suffice him, because the permission given to him for emancipation is interpreted as...