Chapter: Comprehensive Chapter on Oaths
1827 - Issue: Abu al-Qasim, may Allah have mercy on him, said: "Oaths are referred back to intention."
The totality of this is that an oath is based upon the intention of the swearer. If he intends by his oath what it [the wording] admits, his oath is diverted to that, whether what he intended is in agreement with the apparent meaning of the wording or contrary to it. That which is in agreement with the apparent meaning is for one to intend by the expression its primary subject—for example, to intend by a general expression the generalization, by the absolute the absoluteness, and by other expressions what they suggest to the mind. That which is contrary [to the apparent meaning] is divided into several types: One of them is that he intends by a general expression a specific one, such as swearing: "I will not eat meat or fruit," while intending a specific meat and a specific fruit. Among them is that he swears regarding the doing of something or abandoning it absolutely, while intending its performance or abandonment at a specific time, such as one who swears: "I will not have lunch," meaning today, or "I will certainly eat," meaning this hour. Among them is that he intends by his oath something other than what the listener understands from it, as we mentioned regarding the 'ma'arid' (equivocations) in the issue of when he resorts to interpretation in his oath, for he is entitled to his interpretation. Among them is that he intends by a specific expression the general, such as one who swears: "I did not drink water for so-and-so out of thirst," intending to sever every favor he owes him; or: "I will not reside with my wife in a house," intending to treat her coldly by avoiding being gathered with her in any house; or he swears: "I will not wear a garment made from her spinning," intending to sever her favor upon him through it, so his oath becomes attached to benefiting from it or its price—anything she has a favor upon him for. Malik held this view. Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i said: "There is no consideration for intention and cause in what contradicts the wording; for the violation (hinth) is the contradiction of what he contracted the oath upon, and the oath is its wording. If we were to hold him to a violation based on something other than it, we would be holding him to a violation based on what he intended, not what he swore upon. Furthermore, an oath is not established by intention alone, so he does not commit a violation by contradicting it." We hold that he intended by his speech what it admits, and it is linguistically permissible to express it through that, so his oath is diverted to it.
(1) In A and B: "wa-sa'ir" (and others). (2) In M: "an" (that).
باب جامع الأَيْمان
١٨٢٧ - مسألة؛ قال أبو القاسمِ، رَحِمَه اللَّه تعالى: (ويُرْجَعُ فى الأَيْمانِ إِلَى النِّيَّةِ)
وجملةُ ذلك أَنَّ مَبْنَى اليَمِينِ على نِيَّةِ الحالِفِ، فإذا نَوَى بيَمِينِه ما يَحْتَمِلُه، انْصَرَفَتْ يَمِينُه إليه، سواءٌ كان ما نَواهُ مُوافِقًا لظاهِرِ اللَّفْظِ، أو مُخالفًا له، فالمُوافِقُ للظَّاهِرِ أَنْ يَنْوِىَ باللَّفْظِ مَوْضُوعَه الأَصْلِىَّ، مثل أَنْ يَنْوِىَ باللَّفْظِ العامَّ العُمومَ، وبالمُطْلَقِ الإِطْلاقَ، وبسائِرِ (١) الأَلَّفاظِ ما يتَبادَرُ إلى الأفْهامِ منها، والمُخالِفُ يَتَنَوَّعُ أنْواعًا؛ أحَدُها، أن يَنْوِىَ بالعامِّ الخاصَّ، مثل أَنْ يحْلِفَ لا يأكلُ لحمًا ولا فاكهةً. ويريدُ لحمًا بعَيْنِه، وفاكِهَةً بعينِها. ومنها، أَنْ يحْلِفَ على فعلِ شىءٍ أو تَرْكِه مُطْلَقًا، وينْوِىَ فِعْلَه أو تَرْكَه فى وقتٍ بِعَيْنِه، مثل من (٢) يحلِفُ: لا أتَغَدَّى. يعنى اليومَ، أو: لآكُلَنّ. يعنى السَّاعَةَ. ومنها، أَنْ ينْوِىَ بيَمِينِه غيرَ ما يَفْهَمُه السَّامِعُ منه، كما ذكرنَا فى الْمَعارِيضِ، فى مَسْأَلةِ إذا تأَوَّلَ فى يَمِينِه فله تَأْوِيلُه. ومنها، أَنْ يُرِيدَ بالخاصِّ العامَّ، مثل من (٢) يحلِفُ: لا شَرِبْتُ لفلانٍ الماءَ من العَطَشِ. يَنْوى قَطْعَ كلِّ ما له فيه مِنَّةٌ، أَوْ: لا يَأْوِى مع امْرأَتِه فى دارٍ. يريدُ جَفاءَها بتَرْك اجْتِماعِها معه فى جميعِ الدُّورِ، أو حلَفَ: لا يَلْبَسُ ثَوبًا من غَزْلِها. يُريِد قَطْعَ مِنَّتَهَا به، فيتعلَّقُ يَمِينُه بالانْتِفاعِ به، أو بثمَنِه، ممَّا لها فيه مِنَّةٌ عليه. وبهذا قال مالِكٌ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ، والشافِعِىُّ: لا عِبْرَةَ بالنِّيَّةِ والسبّبَ فيما يُخالِفُ لَفْظَه؛ لأنَّ الحِنْثَ مُخالَفَةُ ما عقَدَ عليه اليَمِينَ، واليَمِينُ لَفْظُه، فلو أحْنَثْناه على ما سِواهُ، لأَحْنَثْناهُ على ما نَوَى، لا على ما حَلَفَ، ولأَنَّ النِّيَّةَ بمُجَرَّدِها لا تَنْعَقِدُ بها اليمينُ، فكذلك لا يَحْنَثُ بِمُخالَفَتِها. ولَنا، أَنَّه نَوَى بكلامِه ما يَحْتَمِلُه، ويسُوغُ فى اللُّغَةِ التَّعْبِيرُ به عنه، فيَنْصَرِفُ يَمِينُه إليه
(١) فى أ، ب: "وسائر".(٢) فى م: "أن".