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المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 13 · صفحة 545١٨٢٨ - مسألة؛ قال: (فإن لم ينو شيئا، رجع إلى سبب اليمين وما هيجها)

الترجمة · EN

it is not diverted to what was intended, because it is a mere intention that the wording does not admit; it is similar to what would be the case if one intended that by means of something other than an oath.

1828 - Issue: He said: "If he does not intend anything, reference is made to the cause of the oath and what provoked it."

The summary of this is that when an intention is absent, we look at the cause of the oath and what provoked it, for this is indicative of the intention. So, if he swears, "I will not reside with my wife in this house," we look: if the cause of his oath was anger regarding the house, due to harm that befell him from it or a favor (manah) he felt obliged by, then his oath is specific to it. If it was due to anger that befell him from the woman that warrants estrangement, and the house has no effect on it, it becomes attached to his residing with her in any house. Likewise, if he swears, "I will not wear a garment made of her spinning," if his reason was the sense of obligation towards her, then in whatever way he benefited from it or from its price, he has violated the oath. If the cause of his oath was the coarseness and poor quality of her spinning, his oath does not extend beyond wearing it. The difference of opinion in this issue is like the difference in the one before it, and we have already provided evidence for the attachment of the oath to what one intends, and the cause is evidence of the intention, so the oath attaches to it. It has been established that if the speech of the Lawgiver is specific to one thing due to a general cause, it extends to everything in which that cause is found, such as His decree prohibiting interest (tafadul) in six items, as He established the ruling for everything in which its meaning is found. Likewise, it is the same in the speech of a human. However, if the wording is general and the cause is specific, such as someone who was invited to a meal and swore that he would not eat lunch, or swore that he would not sit—if he had an intention, his oath is according to what he intended. But if he had no intention, the position of Ahmad suggests two narrations: one of them is that the oath is carried upon its general meaning, because Ahmad was asked about a man who swore not to enter a town due to injustice he saw in it, and then the injustice ceased. He said, "The vow must be fulfilled," meaning he must not enter it. The rationale for this is that if the wording of the Lawgiver is general due to a specific cause, it is obligatory to adopt the generality of the wording rather than the specificity of the cause; likewise is the oath of the swearer. The Qadi mentioned, regarding one who swore upon...

الحواشي

(1) In B: "or its poor quality." (2) In M: "with his oath." (3) In the original: "ta'liq" (attachment). (4) In M: "yujad" (is found). (5) In M: "wa-lil-sabab" (and for the cause). (6) Omitted from M.

العربية (المصدر)

تَنْصَرِفُ إلى المَنْوِىِّ؛ لأنَّها نِيَّةٌ مُجَرَّدَةٌ، لا يَحْتَمِلُها اللَّفْظُ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو نَوَى ذلك بغيرِ يَمِينٍ.

١٨٢٨ - مسألة؛ قال: (فَإِنْ لَمْ يَنْوِ شَيْئًا، رُجِعَ إِلَى سَبَبِ الْيَمِينِ ومَا هَيَّجَهَا)

وجملتُه أنَّه إذا عُدِمَت النِّيَّةُ، نَظَرْنا فى سبَبِ اليَمِينِ، وما أثارَها؛ لدلالَتِه على النِّيَّةِ، فإذا حَلَفَ لا يَأْوِى مع امْرَأَتِه فى هذه الدَّارِ، نَظَرْنا؛ فإنْ كان سَبَبُ يَمِينِه غَيْظًا من جِهَةِ الدَّارِ، لضَرَرٍ لحِقَه منها، أو مِنَّةٍ عليه بها، اخْتصَّتْ يَمِينُه بها، وإِنْ كان لِغَيْظٍ لَحِقَه من المَرْأَةِ يَقْتَضِى جَفاءَها، ولا أثَرَ للدَّارِ فيه، تَعَلَّقَ ذلك بإيوائِه معها فى كُلِّ دارٍ، وكذلك إذا حَلَفَ لا يلْبَسُ ثَوْبًا من غَزْلِها، إن كان سَبَبُه المِنَّةَ عليه منها، فكيفما انْتَفَعَ به أو بِثَمَنِه حَنِثَ، وإِنْ كان سَبَب يَمِينِه خُشُونَةَ غَزْلِها ورَداءَتَهُ (١)، لم يَتَعَدّ يَمِينُه (٢) لُبْسَه، والخِلافُ فى هذه المَسْأَلَةِ كالخلافِ فى التى قَبْلَها، وقد دَلَّلْنا على تَعَلُّقِ (٣) اليَمِينِ بما نَواه، والسَّبَبَ دليلٌ على النِّيَّةِ، فيتَعَلَّقُ اليَمِينُ به، وقد ثَبَتَ أَنَّ كلامَ الشارِعِ إذا كان خاصًّا فى شىءٍ لسَبَبٍ عامٍّ، تَعَدَّى إلى ما وُجِدَ (٤) فيه السَّبَبَ، كتَنْصِيصِه على تَحْريمِ التَّفاضُلِ فى أعْيانٍ سِتَّةٍ، أثْبَتَ الحُكْمَ فى كُلِّ ما وُجِدَ (٤) فيه معناها، كذلك فى كلامِ الآدَمِىِّ مثلُه، فأمَّا إِنْ كان اللَّفْظُ عامًّا والسَّبَبُ (٥) خاصًّا، مثل مَن دُعِىَ إلى غَدإءٍ، فحلَفَ أَنْ (٦) لا يَتَغَدَّى، أو حَلَفَ أنْ (٦) لا يقعدَ، فإنْ كانت له نِيَّةٌ، فيَمِينُه على ما نَوَى، وإِنْ لم تكُنْ له نِيَّةٌ، فكلامُ أحمدَ يَقْتَضِى رِوايَتَيْن؛ إحداهُما، أَنَّ اليَمِينَ مَحْمولَةٌ على العُمومِ؛ لأَنَّ أحمدَ سُئِلَ عن رَجُلٍ حَلَفَ أَنْ (٦) لا يَدْخُلَ بَلَدًا، لِظُلْمٍ راهُ فيه، فزالَ الظُّلْمُ؟ فقال: النَّذْرُ يُوفَى به. يَعْنِى لا يَدْخُلُه. ووَجْهُ ذلك أَنَّ لفْظَ الشارِعِ إذا كان عامًّا، لسَبَبٍ خاصٍّ، وجَبَ الأَخْذُ بعُمومِ اللَّفْظِ دُونَ خُصوصِ السَّبَبِ، كذلك يَمِينُ الحالِفِ. وذكرَ القاضِى، فى مَن حَلَفَ على

الحواشي

(١) فى ب: "أو رداءته".(٢) فى م: "بيمينه".(٣) فى الأصل: "تعليق".(٤) فى م: "يوجد".(٥) فى م: "وللسبب".(٦) سقط من: م.

السابقمجلد 13 · صفحة 545التالي
السابق13·545التالي