the subject of the oath is a departure described by a specific attribute, so his oath is not dissolved by the occurrence of something in which the attribute is not present, nor does he break his oath by it, and neither fulfillment nor breaking attaches to what is other than it. It is as if he said: "If you go out naked, you are divorced," or "If you go out riding, you are divorced," and she went out covered and walking; neither fulfillment nor breaking would be attached to it. Similarly, if he said to her: "If you speak to a lewd man, or someone who is not among your unmarriageable kin (mahram), you are divorced," neither fulfillment nor breaking would attach to her speaking to someone who is not described by that attribute, and the same applies to actions. As for their statement that "the oath is attached to one departure," we say: It is, however, a departure described by a specific attribute, so the oath is not dissolved by the occurrence of other than it, and he does not break his oath by it. As for the statement of the companions of Abu Hanifah that "the three phrasings are not among the phrasings of exception," we say: His statement "unless I give you permission" is among the phrasings of exception, and the other two phrasings are in its meaning regarding the exclusion of what is permitted from his oath, so their ruling is the same as its ruling.

This discussion applies when he uses the terms absolutely. If he intended to suspend the divorce upon a single departure, his oath is suspended upon it, and his statement is accepted regarding the ruling because he explained his wording with what it potentially carries with a not-too-distant possibility. If he gave her permission once and intended permission for every time, it is according to what he intended. It has been narrated from 'Abd Allah ibn Ahmad, from his father, that if he swore that his wife shall not go out except with his permission: if he gives her permission once, it is a permission for every time, and his oath is according to what he intended. If he said: "Whenever you go out, it is by my permission," a single time is sufficient for him. If he intended by his saying "until I give you permission," or "up until I give you permission," or "except until I give you permission" the endpoint, and that the departure sworn against is what is before the endpoint, not what is after it, his statement is accepted, and his oath is dissolved by the permission; because of his intention, for the basis of oaths is upon intention.

Section: If he said: "If you go out without my permission, you are divorced," then he gave her permission, then forbade her, and she went out, she is divorced because she went out without his permission. Likewise, if he said: "Except with my permission." Some of the companions of Al-Shafi'i said: He does not break his oath, because he had already given permission. That is not correct, because his prohibition annulled his permission, so she became one going out without his permission. Likewise, if he gave permission to his agent in a sale, then forbade him, and he sold it, it would be void. If he said: "If you go out without my permission for other than visiting a sick person, you are divorced."