and the people of reasoning (Ahl al-Ra'y). These [scholars] and others agreed that it [the category of punishments] is established by the testimony of two men, except for adultery; however, al-Hasan said: Testimony regarding homicide is like testimony regarding adultery, because it involves the destruction of a life, so it resembles adultery. Our response is that it is one of the two types of retaliation (qisas), so it resembles retaliation in cases of bodily injury, and the attribute he mentioned has no effect, for adultery that necessitates a hadd punishment is not established except by four [witnesses], and because the hadd punishment for adultery is a right of Allah Almighty, in which retraction from confession is accepted. In the witnesses of this category, the same requirements of freedom, masculinity, Islam, and probity (adala) are considered as those required for witnesses of adultery, according to what we will mention, God Almighty willing.
The second [type]: That which is not a punishment, such as marriage, returning a wife [after a revocable divorce], divorce, emancipation, ila' (oath of abstention from intercourse), zihar, lineage, appointment of an agent (tawkil), appointment of an executor for a will (wasiyya), wala' (patronage), kitaba (contract of manumission), and their likes. The Qadi said: The relied-upon [position] in the school is that this is not established except by two male witnesses, and the testimony of women is not accepted therein at all. Ahmad has explicitly stated, in the narration of the group, that the testimony of women is not permitted in marriage and divorce. It has been narrated from Ahmad, regarding agency (wakala): If it concerns claiming a debt—meaning the testimony of a man and two women is accepted therein—but as for other than that, it is not. The reasoning for this is that the intent behind agency in demanding a debt is financial, so the testimony of a man and two women is accepted therein, like in the case of hawala (transfer of debt). The Qadi said: It is thus derived from this that marriage and its rights, such as returning a wife and the like, do not accept the testimony of women, according to a single narration, while everything else is derived based on two narrations. Abu al-Khattab said: Two narrations are also derived regarding marriage and emancipation; one of them is that nothing is accepted therein except the testimony of two men. This is the position of al-Nakha'i, al-Zuhri, Malik, the people of Medina, and al-Shafi'i. It is also the position of Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, al-Hasan, and Rabi'ah regarding divorce. The second [narration] is that the testimony of two men and two women is accepted therein. This was narrated from Jabir ibn Zayd, Iyas ibn Mu'awiyah, al-Sha'bi, al-Thawri, Ishaq, and the people of reasoning. It was also narrated in the context of marriage from 'Ata'. They argued that it is not averted by doubt, so it is established by a man and two women, like property. Our response is that it is not property, nor is property the intent behind it, and men are cognizant of it; therefore, there is no entry for women in its testimony, like the hadd punishments and retaliation. What they mentioned is not valid; for doubt has no entry into marriage, and even if it were conceived that a woman might be suspicious of pregnancy, the marriage would not be valid.
(3) In [B]: "al-ma'mul" (the relied-upon). (4) In [B] and [M]: "al-maqsud" (the intended).
وأصْحابُ الرَّأىِ. واتَّفقَ هؤلاء وغيرُهم على أنَّها تَثْبُتُ بشهادةِ رَجُليْنِ، ما خَلَا الزِّنَى، إلَّا الحسنَ؛ فإنَّه قال: الشَّهادةُ على القتلِ، كالشَّهادةِ على الزِّنَى؛ لأنَّه يتعلَّقُ به إتْلافُ النَّفْسِ، فأشْبَهَ الزِّنَى. ولَنا، أنَّه أحدُ نَوْعَىِ القِصاصِ، فأشْبَهَ القِصاصَ فى الطَّرَفِ، وما ذكرَه مِن الوَصْفِ لا أثرَ له، فإن الزِّنَى المُوجِبَ للحدِّ لا يَثْبُتُ إلَّا بأربعةٍ، ولأنَّ حدَّ الزِّنَى حقٌّ للهِ تعالى يُقْبَلُ الرُّجوعُ عن الإقْرارِ به. ويُعْتَبرُ فى شُهداءِ هذا النَّوْعِ من الحُرِّيَّةِ والذُّكُورِيَّةِ والإسْلامِ والعَدالةِ، ما يُعْتَبرُ فى شُهَداءِ الزِّنَى، على ما سنَذْكرُه، إن شاء اللهُ تعالى. الثانى، ما ليس بعُقوبةٍ كالنِّكاحِ، والرَّجْعةِ، والطَّلاقِ، والعَتاقِ، والإيلاءِ، والظِّهارِ، والنَّسبِ، والتَّوكيلِ، والوَصِيَّةِ إليه، والوَلاءِ، والكِتابةِ، وأشْباهِ هذا. فقال القاضى: المُعَوَّلُ (٣) عليه فى المذهب، أنَّ هذا لا يثْبُتُ إلَّا بشاهِدَيْنِ ذكَرَيْنِ، ولا تُقْبَلُ فيه شهادةُ النِّساءِ بحالٍ. وقد نَصَّ أحمدُ، فى روايةِ الجماعةِ، على أنَّه لا تجوزُ شَهادةُ النِّساءِ فى النِّكاحِ والطَّلاقِ. وقد نُقلَ عن أحمدَ، فى الوَكالةِ: إن كانتْ بمُطالَبةِ دَينٍ -يعنى تُقْبَلُ فيه شَهادةُ رجلٍ وامرأتيْنِ- فأمَّا غيرُ ذلك فلا. ووجهُ ذلك؛ أنَّ الوَكالةَ فى اقْتضاءِ الدَّينِ يُقْصَدُ منها المالُ، فيُقْبَلُ فيها شهادةُ رجلٍ وامرأتيْن، كالحَوالَةِ. قال القاضى: فيُخرَّجُ مِن هذا، أنَّ النِّكاحَ وحُقوقَه، مِن الرَّجعةِ وشِبهِها، لا تُقْبَلُ فيها شهادةُ النِّساءِ، روايةً واحدةً، وما عَداه يُخرَّجُ على روايَتَيْنِ. وقال أبو الخَطَّابِ: يُخرَّجُ فى النِّكاحِ والعَتاقِ أيضًا رِوَايتان؛ إحداهما، لا تُقبلُ فيه إلَّا شَهادةُ رجليْنِ. وهو قولُ النَّخَعىِّ، والزُّهْرىِّ، ومالكٍ، وأهلِ المدينةِ، والشَّافعىِّ. وهو قولُ سعيدِ بنِ المُسيَّبِ، والحسنِ، وربيعةَ، فى الطَّلاقِ. والثانية، تُقْبَلُ فيه شهادةُ رَجُليْنِ وامرأتَيْنِ. رُوِىَ ذلك عن جابرِ بنِ زيدٍ، وإياسِ ابنِ مُعاويةَ، والشَّعْبىِّ، والثَّوْرِىِّ، وإسْحاقَ، وأصحابِ الرَّأْىِ. ورُوىَ ذلك فى النِّكاحِ عن عَطاءٍ. واحْتجُّوا بأنَّه لا يَسْقُطُ بالشُّبْهةِ، فيثْبُتُ برجلٍ وامرأتيْنِ، كالمالِ. ولَنا، أنَّه ليس بمالٍ، ولا يُقْصَدُ (٤) منه المالُ، ويَطَّلِعُ عليه الرِّجالُ، فلم يكُنْ للنِّساءِ فى
(٣) فى ب: "المعمول".(٤) فى ب، م: "المقصود".