knowledge, so it is not permissible for the one who hears it to testify based on it. If it is said: "If he hears a man say, 'So-and-so has one thousand dirhams against me,' it is permissible for him to testify to that, so why is this not the same?" We say: There is a difference between the two from two aspects. The first is that testimony can be based on knowledge, while acknowledgment does not allow for that. The second is that acknowledgment is broader in its binding nature than testimony, as evidenced by its validity regarding unknown [amounts] and the fact that the number of witnesses is not considered in it, unlike testimony. Furthermore, acknowledgment is a person's statement against himself, and he is not considered suspicious, so it is stronger than testimony. This is why testimony is not heard regarding the right of the acknowledger, and no ruling is issued based upon it. If the original witness says: "I testify that so-and-so has one thousand [dirhams] against so-and-so, so you testify to it against him," it is not permissible for him to testify to his testimony, because he did not solicit his testimony so that he could testify to it, nor is he a witness to the right, because he did not hear the admission of it from the one against whom it is held, nor did he witness its cause.

Section: As for the method of performance [of the testimony] when he has solicited him to testify, he says: "I testify that so-and-so, son of so-and-so—and I have known him by his person, name, lineage, and probity—has called me to witness that he testifies that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, has such-and-such against so-and-so, son of so-and-so," or "that so-and-so acknowledged such-and-such in my presence." If he does not know his probity, he does not mention it. If he hears him calling another to witness, he says: "I testify that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, called [someone] to witness his testimony that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, has such-and-such against so-and-so, son of so-and-so." If he heard him testify before the judge, he says: "I testify that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, testified against so-and-so, son of so-and-so, before the judge regarding such-and-such." If he attributed the right to its cause, he says: "I testify that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, said: 'I testify that so-and-so, son of so-and-so, has such-and-such against so-and-so, son of so-and-so, [by way of such-and-such].'" If the judge wishes to write this down, he writes it according to what we have mentioned regarding the performance.

Section: The narration differs regarding a fifth condition, which is the quality of being male among the secondary witnesses (shuhud al-far'). According to Ahmad, this is a condition, so women are not accepted as secondary witnesses under any circumstances, regardless of whether the right is one in which the testimony of women is accepted or not. This is the opinion of Malik, al-Thawri, and al-Shafi'i, because they establish [the right] through their testimony