the judgment, so the judgment is overturned, just as it would be if it became clear that they were both disbelievers. Our position is that the right of the person in whose favor the testimony was given became binding upon him, so it does not lapse by their statement, just as if they had claimed it for themselves. This is verified by the fact that a person's right is not extinguished except by clear proof (bayyinah) or his own admission (6), and their retraction is not testimony—which is why it does not require the wording of testimony—nor is it an admission from the holder of the right. This differs from the case where it becomes clear they were disbelievers, because in that case, we have determined that the condition for the judgment—which is the testimony of just witnesses—was not met; whereas in our case, that is not established, because it is possible (7) that they were just and truthful in their testimony, and merely lied in their retraction. It also differs from punishments, where they are not implemented (8); because they (9) are warded off by doubts.

The third condition is that they retract after the implementation; in this case, the judgment is not invalidated, and nothing is incumbent upon the one in whose favor the testimony was given, whether the subject of the testimony was property or a punishment; because the judgment has been completed with the implementation of the adjudged matter and the reaching of the right to its deserving recipient. He may then seek recourse against the two witnesses. Subsequently, one must look: if the matter testified to involved destruction for which there is retaliation in kind, such as killing or wounding (10), we examine their retraction. If they say, "We intentionally testified falsely against him so that he would be killed or have his limb severed," then retaliation is applicable to them. This is the position of Ibn Shubrumah, Ibn Abi Layla, al-Awza'i, al-Shafi'i, and Abu 'Ubayd. The proponents of reason (Ashab al-Ra'y) said: There is no retaliation (qawad) against them, because they did not directly perpetrate the destruction, so they are similar to one who digs a well or sets up a knife, if something is destroyed by them. Our position is that 'Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, had two men testify before him against a man for theft, so he had him cut, then they returned and said, "We made a mistake, this is not the thief." 'Ali said, "If I had known that you had done so intentionally, I would have had you cut" (11). There is no dissenter among the Companions against him, so it constitutes a consensus (ijma'). Furthermore, they caused his death or cutting by something that usually leads to it, so retaliation is incumbent upon them, just as it is for one who compels, and it differs from digging a well or setting up a knife, for that does not usually lead to death. We have mentioned this issue in the [chapter of] Retaliation (12). As for if they say, "We testified against him intentionally, but we did not know that he would be killed by this."