And if they were of those who might be ignorant (14) of that, the blood money (diyah) must be paid from their wealth in the intensified form, because it is quasi-intentional, and the paternal relatives (aqilah) do not bear it, because it is established by their confession, and the aqilah do not bear a confession. If one of them says, "I intentionally killed him," and the other says, "I erred," then the one who acted intentionally owes half of the intensified blood money, and the other owes half of the mitigated blood money, and there is no retaliation (qisas), according to the correct view in the school (madhhab), because it is a case of both intentional killing and error. If each of them says, "I acted intentionally, and my companion erred," it is possible that retaliation must be applied to both, because of each one’s confession of his own intentional act. It is also possible that blood money is required, because each of them only confessed to an intentional act in which he participated with someone who was mistaken, and this does not necessitate retaliation; for a person is only held accountable for his own confession, not for the confession of another. Thus, based on this, an intensified blood money is required from them. If one of them says, "We both acted intentionally," and the other says, "I acted intentionally, and my companion erred," then for the first, retaliation applies, and regarding the second, there are two views, as in the preceding case. If they both say, "We both erred" (15), then they owe the mitigated blood money from their wealth, because the aqilah does not bear a confession. If one of them says, "We acted intentionally together," and the other says, "We erred together," then the first is subject to retaliation, and the second is subject to half of the mitigated blood money, because each (16) of them is held accountable by the ruling of his own confession. If each of them says, "I acted intentionally, and I do not know what my companion did," then they are both subject to retaliation, due to each one’s confession of intentionality. It is also possible that retaliation is not required from them, because if each one’s confession were taken in isolation, no retaliation would be required from him, and a person is only held accountable for his own confession, not for the confession of his companion. If one of them says, "I acted intentionally, and I do not know what my companion intended," his companion is asked, and if (17) he says, "I acted intentionally, and I do not know what my companion intended," then it is like the one preceding it. If he says, "We acted intentionally together" (18), then he is subject to retaliation, and regarding the first, there are two views. If he says, "I erred" or "We erred," then there is no retaliation against either of them. If the state of the other is unknown, such as if he goes insane, dies, or cannot be found, then there is no retaliation against the confessor, and he owes his share of the intensified blood money.