because they [Umar's paternal kin] (3). If it were in the public treasury, he would not have divided it among his people. Also, it is a result of his mistake, so his paternal kin bear it, just like his mistake in matters other than judicial rulings. Al-Shafi'i has two opinions, similar to the two reports. If we say that the blood money is upon his paternal kin, they do not bear anything except one-third or more, and they do not bear the expiation (kaffara); because the paternal kin do not bear the expiation in cases of consensus, and it is the same here, so the expiation remains his personal financial liability. If we say it is from the public treasury, then it ought to include both small and large amounts; because placing it in the public treasury is based on the rationale that he is their deputy, and the mistake of the deputy is the responsibility of the one who deputized him. This includes [both small and large amounts, and because] (4) his mistakes are frequent, making the liability his own personal financial burden would be an injustice to him even if the amount is small, due to the frequency of repetition. This applies whether the judge oversaw the enforcement himself or ordered someone else to oversee it. Our colleagues said: even if the claimant enforced it himself, it is as if the judge enforced it; because the judge empowered him to do so and enabled him, and the claimant claims it is his right. If it is said: if the claimant enforced his right, then the liability should be upon him, just as if he had received a court-awarded sum of money and then the corruption of the witnesses (5) was revealed, the liability would be upon the one who received the right, not the judge. We say: in that case, the property of the one against whom the ruling was made ended up in the hands of the claimant without right, so he is obligated to return it or compensate for it if it is destroyed (6). Here, nothing ended up in his hands, but rather he destroyed something due to the Imam's mistake and his authorizing him to do so, so the two cases are distinct.

Section: If four witnesses testify to adultery, then two people vouch for their character (tazkiya), and the punishment is executed against the accused, then it becomes clear that the witnesses are corrupt (fasiq), or slaves, or some of them, there is no liability upon the witnesses; because they assert that they are in the right and their lying was not known at the time. The liability is upon the two character vouches (muzakkis). This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i. The Qadi said: The liability is upon the judge; because he ruled for his execution without verifying the condition [of the witnesses]. There is no liability upon the two character vouches; because their testimony is a condition, not the compelling cause. Abu al-Khattab said in "Ru'us al-Masa'il": The liability is upon the witnesses who testified to the adultery. Our evidence is that the two character vouches gave false testimony which led to his execution, so the liability is incumbent upon them, just like the witnesses of adultery if...