it does not spread, just as if he had possessed him by inheritance, and it differs from what he explicitly emancipated, because [the latter] he did by his choice, intending it. Our argument is that he performed the cause of emancipation by his own choice and intent, so it spread, and the liability became binding upon him, just as if he had commissioned someone to emancipate his share. It differs from inheritance, for that occurred without his intent or action. Furthermore, whoever initiates the cause of spread (sirayah) by his own choice is liable for its consequences, just as someone who wounds a person and the wound spreads. Also, initiating [the cause of] what spreads and being the reason for it are one and the same regarding the necessity of the ruling of spread, as evidenced by the equal liability of the digger [of a pit] and the pusher [of someone into it] for the resulting harm. However, if he possessed him through inheritance, the emancipation does not spread therein, and it is established only in what he possessed, while the rest remains in bondage, regardless of whether he is wealthy or insolvent; because he did not initiate his emancipation, but rather it occurred without his choice. This is the opinion of Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Abu Yusuf. There is a narration from Ahmad indicating that it does spread to the share of his partner if he is wealthy, because a part of him became free while he was wealthy, so it spreads to the remainder, just as if he were bequeathed [the share] and accepted it. The preferred school (madhhab) is the first view, because he did not emancipate him nor did he initiate it, so he is not liable, and it does not spread, just as in the case of a third party, and it differs from [the case where] he initiated it.

Section: If a minor or a person of unsound mind inherits a share of someone who would become free upon their ownership, that person becomes free, but it does not spread to the remainder, because if it does not spread in the case of a legally responsible person, it is even more so in their case. If it is gifted to them, or bequeathed to them, and they are both insolvent, their guardian must accept it, because it is a benefit to them in the form of emancipating their relative without any harm reaching them. If they are both wealthy, there are two views, based on the question of whether the remainder is to be valued against them if they possess part of him. Regarding this, there are two views: One is that it is not valued, and the emancipation does not spread to it, because it enters his possession without his choice, so it resembles the case where he inherits it. The second is that it is valued against them, because the acceptance of their guardian stands in the place of their own acceptance, so it resembles the agent. According to this view, their guardian should not accept it, due to the harm involved. According to the first view, he must accept it, because it occurs without harm, provided he is someone whose support is not mandatory upon them. And if we say: he has no right to accept it, but he accepts it nonetheless, it is possible that the acceptance is not valid, because he has performed an act that the Sharia did not authorize for him, so it resembles the case where he sells his property at a loss. It is also possible that it is valid, and the liability rests upon him, because he imposed this liability upon him, so it is his responsibility, like the expenses of Hajj if he causes him to perform it.

Section: If he sells a slave who is his blood relative and a third party in a single transaction, the entire slave becomes free if the blood relative is wealthy, and he must guarantee the value of the share [of the slave] to his partner. Abu Hanifa said: He does not guarantee anything to his partner, because his ownership is not complete except with the acceptance of his partner, so it is as if he had permitted him to emancipate his share. Our argument is that his share became free upon his ownership through his own choice, so it is mandatory that the remainder be valued against him along with his wealth, just as if he had purchased him individually. We do not concede that his acceptance is not valid without the acceptance of his partner.

Section: If there is a married bondswoman who has a wealthy son, and he and her husband purchase her while she is pregnant by him in a single transaction, the son's share of his mother becomes free, and it spreads to the husband's share, and it is valued against him. The fetus becomes free upon them both together, because it is the son of the husband and the brother of the son, and neither of them owes the other anything for it, because it became free upon both of them at the same moment. If the situation were the same and she was gifted to them, or bequeathed to them, and they both accepted her at the same moment, then the same rule applies. If one of them accepted her before the other, we must look: if the son accepted first, the mother and her fetus become free upon him; [his share of the mother by ownership, followed by his share of the fetus, and the emancipation spreads to the remainder] [of the mother and the child], and he is liable for the value of their remainder to the husband. If the husband accepted first, the entire fetus becomes free upon him; [his share by ownership, and the remainder by spread, and it was valued against him]. Then, if the son accepts, the entire mother becomes free upon him,