after that. Emancipation differs from divorce in that the second marriage is based upon the first marriage, evidenced by the fact that the divorce he pronounced in the first marriage is counted against him in the second marriage, reducing the number of his divorces, whereas ownership via the right hand is different.

Section: If he says to a slave of his who is shackled, "He is free if he unfastens his shackle," and then says, "He is free if there are not ten pounds (ratls) in his shackle." Then two witnesses testify before the judge that the weight of his shackle is five pounds, so the judge rules for his emancipation and orders the unfastening of his shackle. It is then weighed and found to be ten pounds; the slave becomes free upon the unfastening of his shackle, and we clarify that he did not become free by the condition for which the judge ruled his emancipation. Are the two witnesses liable for his value? There are two views regarding this: The first is that they are liable for it, because their false testimony was the cause of his emancipation and destruction, so they are liable for it, just like testimony that is retracted. Also, because his emancipation occurred by the judge's ruling, which was based on the false testimony, it resembles a ruling based on testimony that the witnesses later retract. This is the view of Abu Hanifah. The second is that they are not liable, which is the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad, because his emancipation did not occur due to the judgment based on their testimony, but rather occurred upon the unfastening of his shackle, and they did not testify to that, so they should not be liable, just as if the judge had not ruled.

Section: If he says to his slave, "You are free whenever you wish," he does not become free until he expresses his wish verbally. Whenever he wishes, he becomes free, whether immediately or after a delay. If he says, "You are free if you wish," it is the same. It is possible that this is restricted to the session, because it is in the position of giving someone a choice (takhyeer). If he were to say to his wife, "Choose yourself," she would not have the choice except immediately; if she delays, her option lapses. Likewise, the suspension on a wish without coupling it to a time that indicates a delay. If he says, "You are free however you wish," it is possible that he becomes free immediately. This is the view of Abu Hanifah, because "however" (kayfa) does not necessitate a condition, a time, or a place, so it does not necessitate suspending the emancipation; it is rather a description of the state, so it necessitates the occurrence of freedom.