And insanity does not contradict it, as evidenced by the validity of the emancipation of an insane person. Based on this, if he pays the wealth to him, he is emancipated; because when the master takes possession from him, he has fulfilled the right that was owed to him, and he has the right to take the wealth from his hand, which entails his release from the debt, so he is emancipated by the rule of the contract. If he does not pay it to him (17), the master may bring him before the judge, and the kitaba is established by evidence. The judge then investigates his wealth; if he finds wealth for him, he turns it over for the kitaba, and he is emancipated. If he does not find wealth for him, he (the judge) grants him the right to declare him incapable (ta'jiz) and obligates him to spend on him, because he has returned to being a slave. Then, if the judge subsequently finds wealth for him that fulfills the amount of the kitaba, he invalidates the master's annulment; because the underlying reality (18) was different from what he had ruled upon, so his ruling is voided, just as if one erred regarding the textual evidence and ruled based on ijtihad. However, he returns to the master what he spent from the time of the annulment, because it was not rightfully owed by him in reality. If he regains sanity and provides evidence that he had already paid the kitaba wealth to him, the master's annulment is also voided, and he (the judge) does not return to him what he spent, because he spent on him while knowing of his freedom, thus he was acting voluntarily, and he cannot recover it. It is appropriate for the judge to require the master to swear an oath that he did not receive the kitaba wealth. This is the opinion of the companions of al-Shafi'i. Our companions did not mention it, but it is a sound view, because [it is possible that he] (19) received it, and the insane person cannot express his position to claim it, so the judge stands in his place in requiring the oath from him concerning it.
Section: The killing of a mukatab is like his death in the annulment of the kitaba, according to the disagreement we have already mentioned, regardless of whether the killer is the master or a stranger. There is no retaliation (qisas) upon his killer if he is a free person; because the mukatab remains a slave as long as a dirham of the debt remains upon him. If the killer was his master and he (the mukatab) did not leave behind enough to fulfill the contract, the kitaba is annulled, what was in his possession returns to his master, and nothing is owed by him; because if something were owed, it would have been owed to him. If it is said: "The killer does not deserve anything from the estate of the one he killed by virtue of the killing," we say: In this case, the wealth of the mukatab does not return to him as an inheritance, but rather by virtue of his ownership over him due to the expiration of the kitaba; rather, the killer is only barred from inheritance. Do you not see that whoever has a deferred debt, if he kills the one who owes the right, his debt becomes due, in one (20) narration, and [similarly] the umm al-walad if she kills her master...
(17) Omitted from: M. (18) In the original: "the false". An alteration/corruption. (19) Omitted from: M. (20) In B, M: "and in".
والجُنُونُ لا يُنافِيه، بدليلِ صِحَّةِ عِتْقِ المَجْنُونِ. فعلى هذا، إِنْ أَدَّى إليه المالَ، عَتَقَ؛ لأنَّ السَّيِّدَ إذا قَبَضَ منه، فقد اسْتَوْفَى حَقَّه الذى كان عليه، وله أخْذُ المالِ مِن يَدِه، فيتَضَمَّنُ ذلك بَراءَتَه من المالِ، فيَعْتِقُ بحُكْمِ العَقْدِ، وإن لم يُؤَدِّ إليه (١٧)، كان للسَّيِّدِ أن يُحْضِرَه عندَ الحاكمِ، وَتَثْبُتُ الكِتابةُ بالبَيِّنَةِ، فيَبْحَثُ الحاكمُ عن مالِه، فإنْ وَجَدَ له مالًا، سَلَّمَه فى الكِتابةِ، وعَتَقَ، وإن لم يَجِدْ له مالًا، جَعَلَ له أَنْ يُعَجِّزَه، ويُلْزِمَه الإِنْفاقَ عليه؛ لأَنَّه عادَ قِنًّا، ثمَّ إِنْ وَجَدَ له الحاكمُ بعدَ ذلك مالًا يَفِى بمالِ الكِتابةِ، أَبْطَلَ فَسْخَ السَّيِّدَ؛ لأنَّ الباطِنَ (١٨) بان بخِلافِ ما حَكَمَ به، فبَطَلَ حُكْمُه، كما إذا أخْطَأَ النَّصَّ وحَكَمَ بالاجْتِهادِ، إِلَّا أنَّه يَرُدُّ على السَّيِّدَ ما أَنْفَقَه مِن حينِ الفَسْخِ؛ لأَنَّه لم يَكُنْ مُسْتَحَقًّا عليه فى الباطِنِ. وإن أفَاقَ، فأقامَ البَيِّنَةً أنَّه كان قد دَفَعَ إليه مالَ الكِتابةِ، بَطَلَ أيضًا فَسْخُ السَّيِّدِ، ولا يَرُدُّ عليه ما أَنْفَقَهَ؛ لأَنَّه أَنْفَقَ عليه مع عِلْمِه بحُرِّيَّتِه، فكان مُتَطَوِّعًا بذلك، فلم يَرْجِعْ به. ويَنْبَغِى أَنْ يَسْتَحْلِفَ السَّيِّدَ الحاكمُ، أَنَّهُ ما اسْتَوْفَى مالَ الكِتابةِ. وهذا قولُ أصْحابِ الشافعىِّ. ولم يَذْكُرْه أصحابُنا، وهو حَسَنٌ؛ لأَنَّه [يَحْتَمِلُ أَنَّهُ] (١٩) اسْتَوْفاهُ، والمَجْنُونُ لا يُعْبِّرُ عن نَفسِه فيَدَّعِيه، فيقومُ الحاكمُ مَقامَه فى اسْتِحْلافِه عليه.
فصل: وقَتْلُ المُكاتَبِ كمَوْتِه، فى انْفِساخِ الكِتابةِ، على ما أسْلَفْنا من الخِلافِ، سواءٌ كان القاتلُ السَّيِّدَ أو الأجْنَبِىَّ. ولا قِصاصَ على قاتِلِه الحُرِّ؛ لأنَّ المُكاتَبَ عَبْدٌ ما بَقِىَ عليه دِرْهَمٌ. فإِنَّ كان القاتلُ سَيِّدَه ولم يُخَلِّفْ وَفاءً، انْفَسَخَتِ الكِتابةُ، وعاد ما فى يَدِه إلى سَيِّدِه، ولم يَجِبْ عليه شىءٌ؛ لأَنَّه لو وَجَبَ لوَجَبَ له. فإِن قيل: فالقاتِلُ لا يَسْتَحِقُّ بالقَتْلِ شيئًا مِن تَركَةِ المَقْتولِ. قُلْنا: ههنا لا يَرْجِعُ إليه مالُ المُكاتَبِ مِيراثًا، بل بِحُكْم مِلْكِه عليه، لزَوَالِ الكِتابةِ، وإنَّما يُمْنَعُ القاتلُ المِيراثَ خاصَّةً، ألا تَرَى أَنَّ مَنْ له دَيْنٌ مُؤَجَّل، إذا قَتَلَ مَنْ عليه الحَقُّ، حَلَّ دَيْنُه، فى (٢٠) رِوَايةٍ، وأُمَّ الوَلَدِ إذا قَتَلَتْ سَيِّدَها
(١٧) سقط من: م.(١٨) فى الأصل: "الباطل". تحريف.(١٩) سقط من: م.(٢٠) فى ب، م: "وفى".