The heir is legally competent, he takes possession for himself, and it is not valid for him to appoint a representative to take possession for him; because the legally competent person is his own guardian. If some of them are competent and some are under guardianship, the ruling for each one of them is the same as if he were alone. If some of them permit him to pay to the others, and the one who permitted him (1) in that is competent, and he pays the full share to the other, his share is emancipated. If he is insolvent, it does not extend to the share of his partner, and if he is solvent, his entire share is emancipated, and the remainder is appraised against him, just as if it were between two partners and one of them emancipated his share. This is the apparent view in the statements of al-Khiraqi, and it is one of the two opinions of al-Shafi'i. The Qadi said: His emancipation does not extend (2), even if he is solvent. This (3) is the second opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: He is not emancipated until he pays all of the kitaba wealth, because he only paid a portion of the kitaba wealth, so it resembles the case where he paid it to the master. If he releases him from the kitaba wealth, he is discharged from it, and he is emancipated. If some of them release him, his share is emancipated, and likewise if he emancipates his share from him, it is emancipated. The disagreement regarding all of this is like the disagreement regarding whether he pays to some of them with the permission of the others. Our argument for the fact that the share of whoever releases him (4) from his right upon him is emancipated, or if he satisfies his share with the permission of his partners, is that he has released him from all of his wealth that he owed him, so it must be that emancipation follows, just as if his master had released him from all of the kitaba wealth. This differs from the case where his master releases him from part of the kitaba wealth, because he did not release him from all of his right. Our argument for the extension of his emancipation is that it is an emancipation of a portion of a slave whose emancipation is permitted, coming from a solvent person who is allowed to dispose of his property and is not under interdiction, so it must be that his emancipation extends, just as if he were a standard slave, and because it is an emancipation that occurred through his action and choice, so it extends, similar to the agreed-upon case. If it is said: In extension, there is harm (5) to the partners, because he might become incapable, and thus return to slavery. We say: If emancipation in the agreed-upon case removes established slavery, which has no kitaba in it, then it is more fitting that it removes the incidental aspect of that.
1984 - Issue: He said: (And his wala' [patronage rights] belongs to his master, and if he becomes incapable, he is a slave to the rest of the heirs.)
[Meaning to all the heirs] (1); as for when he becomes incapable and is returned to slavery, he is a slave to all the heirs,
(1) Omitted from: The original, A, B. (2) In B, an addition: "to". (3) In B: "And this". (4) In the original, A, B: "he released". (5) In M: "harm". (1) Omitted from: M.
الوارِثُ رَشِيدًا، قَبَضَ لنَفْسِه، ولا تَصِحُّ الوَصِيّةُ إلى غيرِه ليَقْبِضَ له؛ لأنَّ الرَّشِيدَ وَلِىُّ نَفْسِه. وإن كان بعضُهم رَشِيدًا، وبعضُهم مُولَّيًا عليه، فحكمُ كلِّ واحدٍ منهم حُكْمُه لو انْفَرَدَ. وإِنْ أَذِنَ بعضُهم له فى الأداءِ إلى الآخَرِ، وكان الذى أذِنَ له (١) فى ذلك رَشِيدًا، فأدَّى إلى الآخَرِ جَمِيعَ حَقِّه، عَتَقَ نَصِيبُه، فإن كان مُعْسِرًا، لم يَسْرِ إلى نَصِيبِ شَرِيكِه، وإن كان مُوسِرًا، عَتَقَ عليه كلُّه، وقُوِّمَ عليه باقِيه، كما لو كان بين شَرِيكَيْنِ فأعْتَقَ أحَدُهُما نَصِيبَه. وهذا ظاهرُ كلامِ الْخِرَقِىِّ. وهو أحدُ قَوْلَىِ الشافعىِّ. وقال القاضى: لا يَسْرِى (٢) عِتْقُه، وإن كان مُوسِرًا. وهو (٣) القولُ الثانى للشافعىِّ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ: لا يَعْتِقُ إِلَّا بأدَاءِ جميعِ مالِ الكِتابةِ؛ لأَنَّه أدَّى بعضَ مالِ الكِتابةِ، فأشْبَهَ ما لو أدَّاهُ إلى السَّيِّدِ. وإن أبْرَأهُ من مالِ الكِتابةِ، بَرِئَ منه، وعَتَقَ. وإن أبْرَأهُ بعضُهم، عَتَقَ نَصِيبُه، وكذلك إن أعْتَقَ نَصِيبَه منه، عَتَقَ. والخِلافُ فى هذا كلِّه، كالخِلافِ فيما إذا أدَّى إلى بعضِهم بإذْنِ الآخَرِ. ولَنا، على أنَّه يَعْتِقُ نصيبُ مَنْ أبْرَأهُ (٤) مِن حَقِّه عليه، أو اسْتَوْفَى نَصِيبَه بإذْنِ شُرَكائِه، أنَّه أبْرَأهُ مِن جميعِ مالَه عليه، فوَجَبَ أن يَلْحَقَه العِتْقُ، كما لو أبْرَأهُ سَيِّدُه من جميِع مالِ الكِتابةِ، وفارَقَ ما إذا أبْرَأهُ سَيِّدُه مِن بعضِ مالِ الكِتابةِ؛ لأَنَّه ما أبْرَأهُ مِن جميِع حَقِّه. ولَنا، على سِرَايةِ عِتْقِه، أنَّه إعْتاقٌ لبعضِ العبدِ الذى يجوزُ إعْتاقُه، مِن مُوسِرٍ جائِزِ التَّصَرُّفِ، غيرِ مَحْجُورٍ عليه، فوَجَبَ أن يَسْرِىَ عِتْقُه، كما لو كان قِنًّا، ولأنَّه عِتْقٌ حَصَلَ بفِعْلِه واخْتِيارِه، فسَرَى، كمَحَلِّ الوِفَاقِ. فإن قِيلَ: فى السِّرايَةِ إضْرَارٌ (٥) بالشُّرَكاءِ؛ لأَنَّه قد يَعْجِزُ، فيُرَدُّ إلى الرِّقِّ. قُلْنا: إذا كان العِتْقُ فى مَحَلِّ الوِفَاقِ يُزِيلُ الرِّقَّ المُتَمَكّنَ، الذى لا كِتابةَ فيه، فَلأَن يُزِيلَ عَرَضِيَّةَ ذلك بطرَيقِ الأَوْلَى.
١٩٨٤ - مسألة؛ قال: (وَوَلَاؤُهُ لِسَيِّدِهِ، وَإِنْ عَجَزَ، فَهُوَ عَبْدٌ لِسَائِرِ الْوَرَثةِ)
[يعْنِى لجَميعِ الوَرَثةِ] (١)، أمَّا إذا عَجَزَ، ورُدَّ فى الرِّقِّ، فإنَّه يكونُ عَبْدًا لجميعِ الوَرَثةِ،
(١) سقط من: الأصل، أ، ب.(٢) فى ب زيادة: "إلى".(٣) فى ب: "وهذا".(٤) فى الأصل، أ، ب: "أبرأ".(٥) فى م: "ضرر".(١) سقط من: م.