maintenance; for it is secondary to his earnings, and his earnings belong to her, so his maintenance is upon her. As for his emancipation, he is emancipated by her payment [of the kitaba installments] or her being released from the debt, and he remains a slave through her incapacity, for he follows her status. If the mukataba (a female slave in a kitaba contract) dies while still under her contract, her contract is invalidated and he returns to being an absolute slave, unless she leaves behind enough [wealth] to fulfill the contract, in which case there are two narrations [on the ruling]. If her master emancipates her, her child is not emancipated; because he only followed her in the legal status of the kitaba, which is emancipation upon payment, and the payment did not occur. Her emancipation occurred through a matter in which he does not follow her, so it is similar to the case where she was not a mukataba. The implication of the statement of our companions who said, "Her contract is invalidated by her emancipation," is that her child returns to being a slave. The implication of our own position is that he remains under the legal status of the kitaba and is emancipated upon payment, because the contract itself has not been invalidated by anything; rather, the payment was waived for her due to the realization of her freedom without it. If she does not have a child who follows her in the kitaba, nor does she possess wealth that he might take, the legal effect of the persistence of the contract would not be apparent, and there would be no benefit in its continuation, so it would be negated due to the absence of its utility. In our current issue, however, there is utility in its continuation, because it leads to the emancipation of her child, so it is fitting that it remains. It is also possible that he is emancipated by her emancipation, because this functions in the same way as her being released from the debt. The ruling regarding the case where she is emancipated through istilad (being an umm al-walad), tadbir (a promise of emancipation after death), or suspension upon a condition, is the same as the ruling regarding the case where [the master] voluntarily emancipates her; because she became emancipated through means other than the kitaba. If the master emancipates the child without her, his emancipation is valid. Ahmad explicitly stated this in the narration of Muhanna; because he is owned by him, so his emancipation is valid, like his mother. Also, because if he had emancipated him along with her, it would have been valid, and whoever's emancipation is valid alongside another, it is valid to emancipate him individually, like his other slaves. The Qadi said: "It should have been the case that his emancipation would not take effect, because it contains harm to his mother by causing the loss of his earnings for her, as she was utilizing him to assist in her kitaba." Perhaps Ahmad gave effect to his emancipation by prioritizing the principle of emancipation. The correct view is that he is emancipated, and what the Qadi mentioned regarding the harm is invalid for several reasons: First, that the harm only occurs in the case of someone whose earnings exceed their own maintenance; as for someone who has no earnings, then freeing her from his maintenance is a pure benefit, so there is no harm in his emancipation, because there is no surplus of his earnings for her.