anything that can be benefited from, so it would have been fitting that he restrict the ruling he mentioned with this condition. Second, that the benefit from her earnings is not a right due to her; evidenced by the fact that she does not possess the authority to compel him to work, so the harm [caused] by the loss of his [potential] earnings is not considered in her right. Third, that the mere existence of harm is not sufficient to prevent emancipation, the requirement of which has been realized, unless it has a legal basis that supports its consideration, and he did not cite any basis for it. Furthermore, it is nullified by the emancipation of the insolvent, the mortgagor, and the extension of emancipation to the share of a partner, as he is emancipated despite the existence of harm caused by the loss of a required right, so this [current case] is more worthy [of allowing emancipation].

Section: As for the child of her child, the child of her son has the same legal status as his mother, because the child of a mukatab does not follow [the mukatab status] if he is his child. As for the child of her daughter, he is like her daughter. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: The kitaba contract does not extend to him, because the extension [sariya] only occurs with contiguity, and this is a separated child, so it does not extend to him, evidenced by the fact that the child of an umm al-walad, before she is made an umm al-walad, is not subject to the status of istilad, and this child was contiguous with his mother, not his grandmother. Our argument is that the daughter had the ruling established for her as a consequence, so it must be established for her daughter as a consequence, just as it was established for her [the daughter] as a consequence of her mother. Also, because the daughter followed her mother, it is necessary that her child follows her, because the reason for her following her mother exists in her child. Furthermore, because the right of emancipation has become attached to the daughter, it must extend to her child, like [the case of] the mukataba. This dispute concerns the child of a daughter who follows her mother in the kitaba contract; as for one born before the kitaba, they do not enter into the kitaba, and her daughter is even more so.