as if they had entered into the state of Ihram for Hajj with their permission. Our position is that they [the husband or master] have the right to forbid them from it from the start, so they have the right to forbid them from it continuously, just like a loan (ariyah). This differs from Hajj because it becomes mandatory upon commencing it, contrary to I'tikaf, according to the disagreement mentioned regarding it. If that which they were permitted to perform is a vowed act, they do not have the right to make them annul it; because it becomes defined upon commencing it, and it is obligatory to complete it, so it becomes like Hajj when one enters into its state of Ihram. As for if they vowed the I'tikaf and the master or husband wished to prevent them from entering into it, you must consider: if the vow was with their permission and it was a specific [vow], they do not own the right to prevent them from it; because it became obligatory with their permission. If it was without their permission, they have the right to prevent them from it; because their vow involved the loss of another person's right without his permission, so the owner of the right has the right to prevent them from it. If the vow for which permission was granted was not specific, do they have the right to prevent them? There are two views: one of them is that they may prevent them; because their right is established at every time, so the defining of the time of its expiration rests with them, like a debt. The second is that they do not have that right; because its commitment was made obligatory with their permission, so it resembles the specific one. As for the one who is partially emancipated, if there is an agreement of rotation (muhay'ah) between him and his master, he has the right to observe I'tikaf on his day without his master's permission; because his benefits are not owned by his master on that day, and his status on his master's day is the status of an absolute slave. If there is no agreement of rotation between them, his master may prevent him; because he has ownership of his benefits at all times.

Section: As for the mukatab (slave with a contract of manumission), his master has no right to prevent him from an obligatory or a voluntary [act]; because he does not deserve his benefits, and he has no right to compel him to earn, for he only has a debt in his liability, so he is like a free debtor.