a state of exemption from defects. The second view is that he may recover from him. This is the manifest position of the school and the view of Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i, because the contract of sale entails soundness from any defect that the buyer did not perceive. Thus, when it appears to be defective, the option (khiyar) is established for him. Furthermore, the seller is only entitled to the price of the defective item, not the sound one, because he did not own it as sound; therefore, there is no meaning in obligating the payment of the full price. That he was not negligent does not necessitate that he be entitled to the price of what he did not deliver, as evidenced by a defect in a slave that he did not know about.
Once this is established, if the sold item is of a type that has no value when broken, such as spoiled chicken eggs, black pomegranates, rotten walnuts, or damaged melons, he recovers the entire price; because by this, the corruption of the contract from its origin is made clear, as it occurred upon something that has no benefit, and it is not valid to sell what has no benefit, like insects and carcasses. He is not obligated to return the sold item to the seller, because there is no benefit in it.
Secondly, if it is of a type whose defective state has value, such as coconuts, ostrich eggs, watermelons that have some benefit, and the like, then when he breaks it, one must examine: if it is a breakage without which the sold item cannot be known, then the buyer has the option between returning it and returning the compensation (arsh) for the breaking and taking back the price, or taking the compensation for its defect, which is the proportional difference between its sound and defective state. This is the apparent position of al-Khiraqi. The Qadi said: In my view, he is not liable for compensation for his breaking it, because that occurred by way of investigating the defect, and the seller gave him authority over it, since he knew that its soundness from its corruption could not be known otherwise. This is the view of al-Shafi'i. The reasoning for al-Khiraqi’s view is that it is a deficiency that did not prevent the return, so he is obligated to return its compensation, like the milk of the musarrat (an animal whose milk has been withheld in the udder) when he milks it, or a virgin when he has intercourse with her. By these two principles, what he (the Qadi) mentioned is refuted, for it is for the sake of investigating the defect, and the seller gave him authority over it—nay, it is even more appropriate here because it is deception on the part of the seller, and the tasriya (withholding milk) occurred by his deception.
If it is a breakage without which the sold item could have been known, but it does not destroy the sold item entirely, the ruling is the same as the one before it according to al-Khiraqi, which is also the view of the Qadi. The buyer has the option between returning it and paying the compensation for the breaking and taking back the price, or taking the compensation for the defect. This is one of the two narrations from Ahmad. The second narration is that he does not have the right to return it, and he has the right to the compensation for the defect. This is the view of Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi'i, and we have mentioned this previously. If he breaks it in a way that leaves it with no value, he has only the compensation for the defect, because he destroyed it. The amount of the compensation for the defect is the proportional difference between the sound and defective state of the price. The sold item is valued as sound, then it is valued as defective without being broken, and the buyer is entitled to the difference between them from the price, according to what has already been explained.
مَجْرَى البَراءَةِ من العُيُوبِ. والثانيةُ، يَرْجِعُ عليه. وهى ظاهِرُ المذهبِ، وقولُ أبى حنيفةَ والشَّافِعىِّ؛ لأَنَّ عَقْدَ البَيْعِ اقْتَضَى السَّلامَةَ من عَيْبٍ لم يَطَّلِعْ عليه المُشْتَرِى، فإذا بانَ مَعِيبًا، ثَبَتَ له الخِيارُ، ولأنَّ البائِعَ إنَّما يسْتَحِقُ ثَمَنَ المَعيِبِ، دونَ الصَّحِيحِ؛ لأنَّه لم يَمْلِكْه صَحِيحًا، فلا مَعْنَى لإِيجابِ الثَّمَنِ كُلِّه، وكَوْنُه لم يُفَرِّطْ لا يَقْتَضِى أن يَجبَ له ثَمَنُ ما لم يُسَلِّمْه؛ بِدَلِيلِ العَيْبِ الذى لم يَعْلَمْه فى العَبْدِ. إذا ثبَتَ هذا، فإنَّ المَبِيعَ إن كان ممَّا لا قِيمَةَ له مَكْسُورًا، كبَيْضِ الدَّجاجِ الفاسِدِ، والرُّمَّانِ الأسْوَدِ، والجَوْزِ الخَرِبِ، والبِطِّيخِ التَّالِفِ، رَجَعَ بالثَّمَنِ كلِّه؛ لأنَّ هذا تَبَيَّنَ به فَسادُ العَقْدِ من أصْلِه؛ لِكَونِه وَقَعَ على ما لا نَفْعَ فيه، ولا يَصِحُّ بَيْعُ ما لا نَفْعَ فيه، كالحَشَراتِ والمَيْتاتِ، وليس عليه أن يَرُدَّ المَبِيعَ إلى البائِعِ؛ لأنَّه لا فائِدَةَ فيه. الثانى، أن يكونَ ممَّا لِمَعِيبِه قِيمَةٌ، كَجَوْزِ الهِنْدِ، وبَيْضِ النَّعامِ، والبِطِّيخِ الذى فيه نَفْعٌ، ونحوِه، فإذا كَسَرَهُ نَظَرْتَ، فإن كان كَسْرًا لا يُمْكِنُ اسْتِعْلامُ المَبِيعِ بدونِه، فالمُشْتَرِى مُخَيَّرٌ بَيْنَ رَدِّهِ ورَدِّ أَرْشِ الكَسْرِ وأخْذِ الثَّمَنِ، وبين أخْذِ أرْشِ عَيْبِه، وهو قِسْطُ ما بين صَحِيحِه ومَعِيبِه، وهذا ظاهِرُ كَلامِ الخِرَقِىِّ. وقال القاضِى: عندى لا أرْشَ عليه لِكَسْرِه؛ لأنَّ ذلك حَصَلَ بِطَرِيقِ اسْتِعْلامِ العَيْبِ، والبائِعُ سَلَّطَهُ عليه، حيثُ عَلِم أنَّه لا تُعْلَمُ له صِحَّتُه مِن فَسادِه بغيرِ ذلك. وهذا قولُ الشَّافِعِىِّ. وَوَجْهُ قولِ الخِرَقِىِّ، أنَّه نَقْصٌ لم يَمْنَع الرَّدَّ، فَلَزِمَ رَدُّ أَرْشِه، كلَبَنِ المُصَرَّاةِ إذا حَلَبَها، والبِكْرِ إذا وَطِئها، وبهذَيْن الأصْلَيْنِ يَبْطُلُ ما ذَكَرَه، فإنَّه لِاسْتِعْلامِ العَيْبِ، والبائِعُ سَلَّطَه عليه، بل هاهُنا أوْلَى؛ لأنَّه تَدْلِيسٌ من البائِعِ، والتَّصْرِيَةُ حَصَلَتْ بِتَدْلِيسِه، وإن كان كَسْرًا يُمْكِنُ اسْتِعْلامُ المَبِيعِ بدُونِه، إلَّا أنَّه لا يُتْلِفُ المَبِيعَ بالكُلِّيَّةِ، فالحُكْمُ فيه كالذى قبلَه فى قَوْلِ الخِرَقِىِّ، وهو قولُ القاضِى أيضًا. والمُشْتَرِى مُخَيَّرٌ بين رَدِّه وأَرْشِ الكَسْرِ وأخْذِ الثَّمَنِ، وبين أخْذِ أرْشِ العَيْبِ. وهو إحْدَى الرِّوايَتَيْنِ عن أحمدَ. والرِّوايَةُ الثانية، ليس له رَدُّه، وله أرْشُ العَيْبِ. وهذا قولُ أبى حنيفة والشَّافِعىِّ، وقد ذَكَرْنا ذلك فيما تَقَدَّمَ. وإن كَسَرَه كَسْرًا لا يُبْقِى له قِيمَةً، فلَهُ أرْشُ العَيْبِ، لا غيرُ؛ لأنَّه