752 - Issue: He said: "And if he reports a decrease from his capital, the purchaser must return it, or give him what he made an error with; and he has the right to make him swear that at the time he sold it, he did not know that its purchase price was more."
The entirety of this matter is that if he says in a murabaha sale: "My capital in it is one hundred, and I profit ten," then he returns and says: "I made a mistake; my capital in it is one hundred and ten," his statement regarding the error is not accepted except with evidence (bayyina) that testifies that his capital on it is what he stated secondarily. Ibn al-Mundhir mentioned this from Ahmad and Ishaq. Abu Talib narrated from Ahmad that if the seller is known for truthfulness, his statement is accepted, and if he is not truthful, the sale is permissible. Al-Qadi said: The apparent meaning of al-Khiraqi's words is that the statement is that of the seller, along with his oath; because when he entered into the murabaha with him, he trusted him, and the statement is that of the trusted party along with an oath, like the agent (wakil) and the mudarib (partner in silent partnership). The obvious point is that al-Khiraqi did not omit mentioning what is required of the seller in proving his claim because he accepts his mere claim, but rather because he linked it to the previous issue, in which he already mentioned [the topic], so it is known that he increased the capital, even if he did not dwell on how knowledge is obtained. However, we already know that knowledge is only obtained through evidence or admission; likewise, the knowledge of his error here is obtained through evidence or the purchaser's admission. The fact that the seller is entrusted does not necessitate the acceptance of his claim regarding an error, like the mudarib and the agent when they admit to a profit, then say: "We made a mistake" or "We forgot." The oath that al-Khiraqi mentioned here is only to negate his knowledge of his own error at the time of the sale, not to prove the error itself. There is a third narration from Ahmad that the seller's statement is not accepted, even if he brings evidence, until the purchaser confirms it. This is the view of al-Thawri and al-Shafi'i; because he admitted to the price, and the right of another party became attached to it. Thus, his retraction and his evidence are not accepted, due to his admission of their falsehood. Our argument is that it is just evidence that testified to what is potentially true, so it is accepted, like all other evidence. It is not conceded that he admitted to the contrary; for an admission is for someone other than the person making it, and at the time of his reporting its price, there was no right upon him for another, so it was not an admission.
(1) In [MS] M: "'ala nafs" (on the soul/self).
٧٥٢ - مسألة؛ قال: (وإنْ أخْبَرَ بِنُقْصَانٍ مِنْ رَأْسِ مَالِه، كَانَ عَلَى المُشْتَرى رَدُّه، أوْ إعْطَاؤُه مَا غَلِطَ بهِ، وَلهُ أنْ يُحَلِّفَهُ أنَّ وَقْتَ ما باعَهَا لَمْ يَعْلَمْ أنَّ شِرَاءَهَا بأكْثَرَ)
وجملةُ ذلك، أنَّه إذا قال فى المُرابَحَةِ: رَأْسُ مالِى فيه مائَةٌ، وأرْبَحُ عَشَرَةً. ثم عادَ فقال: غَلِطْتُ، رَأْسُ مالِى فيه مائةٌ وعَشَرَةٌ. لم يُقْبَلْ قَوْلُه فى الغَلَطِ، إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ تَشْهَدُ أنَّ رَأْسَ مالِه عليه ما قاله ثانِيًا. وذَكَرَه ابنُ المُنْذِرِ عن أحمدَ وإسْحاقَ. ورَوَى أبو طالِبٍ عن أحمدَ، إذا كان البائِعُ مَعْرُوفًا بالصِّدْقِ، قُبِلَ قَوْلُه، وإنْ لم يَكُنْ صَدُوقًا، جازَ البَيْعُ. قال القاضى: وظاهِرُ كلامِ الخِرَقِىِّ، أنَّ القولَ قولُ البائِعِ مع يَمِينِه؛ لأنَّه لمَّا دَخَلَ معه فى المُرابَحَةِ فقد ائْتَمَنَه، والقولُ قولُ الأمِينِ مع يَمِينِه، كالوَكِيلِ والمُضارِبِ. والظَّاهِرُ أنَّ الخِرَقِىَّ لم يَتْرُكْ ذِكْرَ ما يَلْزَمُ البائِعَ فى إثْباتِ دَعْواهُ؛ لكَوْنِه يَقْبَلُ مُجَرَّدَ دَعْواه، بل لأنَّه عَطَفَه على المَسْأَلَةِ قبلها، وقد ذَكَرَ فيها، فعَلِمَ أنَّه زادَ فى رَأْسِ المالِ، ولم يَتَعَرَّضْ لما يَحْصُلُ به العِلْمُ، لكنْ قد عَلِمْنا أنَّ العِلْمَ إنَّما يَحْصُلُ بِبَيِّنَةٍ أو إقْرارٍ، كذلك عِلْمُ غَلَطِه هاهُنا يَحْصُلُ بِبَيِّنَةٍ أو إقْرارٍ من المُشْتَرِى، وكونُ البائِعِ مُؤْتَمَنًا لا يُوجِبُ قَبُولَ دَعْواه فى الغَلَطِ، كالمُضارِبِ والوَكِيلِ إذا أقَرَّا بِرِبْحٍ، ثم قالا: غَلِطْنا أو نَسِينا. واليَمِينُ التى ذَكَرَها الخِرَقِىُّ هاهُنا، إنَّما هى نَفْىُ (١) عِلْمِه بِغَلَطِ نَفْسِه وقتَ البَيْعِ، لا على إثْباتِ غَلَطِه. وعن أحمدَ رِوايَةٌ ثالثةٌ، أنَّه لا يُقْبَلُ قَوْلُ البائِعِ، وإنْ أقامَ به بَيِّنَةً حتى يُصَدِّقَه المُشْتَرِى. وهو قولُ الثَّوْرِىِّ والشَّافِعِىِّ؛ لأنَّه أقَرَّ بالثَّمَنِ، وتَعَلَّقَ به حَقُّ الغَيْرِ. فلا يُقْبَلُ رُجُوعُه ولا بَيِّنَتُه؛ لإقْرَارِه بِكَذِبِهَا. ولَنا، أنَّها بَيِّنَةٌ عادِلَةٌ، شَهِدَتْ بما يَحْتَمِلُ الصِّدْقَ، فَتُقْبَلُ، كسائِر البَيِّناتِ. ولا يُسَلَّمُ أنَّه أقَرَّ بخِلافِها؛ فإنَّ الإِقْرارَ يكونُ لغير المُقِرِّ، وحالَةَ إخْبارِه بِثَمَنِها لم يكنْ عليه حَقٌّ لغيرِه، فلم يكن إقْرارٌ.
(١) فى م: "على نفس".