and the attachment of the seller's right to the liability (dhimma). Prioritizing what is attached to the specific item is more appropriate due to its confirmation, and for that reason, the debt for which a pledge is held is prioritized in its price over what is attached to the liability. This differs from the pledge, for the interest of the pledge contract is not attached to it, whereas the delivery here is related to the interest of the sale contract. As for when the price is a specific object, the right has also attached to its substance, like the sold item, so they are equal, and there is a right due to each one of them from the other, the taking possession of which has been established as a right. Thus, each of them is compelled to fulfill the right of the other. The reasoning for the other narration is that which the stability and completion of the sale are attached to is the sold item, so prioritizing it is mandatory. And because the price does not become specific by mere designation, it resembles the non-specific. Once this is established, and we have made delivery mandatory upon the seller, he delivers it; the buyer must then either be solvent or insolvent. If he is solvent and has the price with him, he is compelled to deliver it. If it is absent but nearby in his house or city, he is placed under interdiction (hajr) regarding the sold item and the rest of his wealth until he delivers the price, for fear that he might dispose of his wealth in a way that harms the seller. If it is absent from the city, at a distance of shortening prayer (masafat al-qasr), the seller is given the choice between waiting until it is found or rescinding the contract, because the price has become inaccessible to him, so he is like the bankrupt. If it is less than the distance of shortening prayer, he has the option in one of the two opinions, because there is harm in it for him. The second opinion is that he has no option, because less than the distance of shortening prayer is equivalent to it being present. If the buyer is insolvent, the seller may rescind immediately and reclaim the sold item. All of this is the school of al-Shafi'i. However, it seems stronger to me that he is not obligated to deliver the sold item until he produces the price and the buyer is able to deliver it, because the seller only agreed to part with the sold item in exchange for the price, so he is not obliged to hand it over before receiving its substitute. Also, the two contracting parties are equal in the exchange, so they are equal in delivery. The aforementioned preference (tarjih) only influences the prioritization of delivery when the other substitute is present, due to the lack of harm in that. But with the risk that necessitates interdiction, or what is subject to rescission, it should not be established.
(12) Omitted from the original. (13) In MS M: "al-bay'" (the sale). (14) In MS M: "al-hazr" (the prohibition).
وتَعَلُّقِ حَقِّ البائِعِ بالذِّمَّةِ، وتَقْدِيمُ ما تَعَلَّقَ بالعَيْنِ أوْلَى؛ لِتَأكُّدِه، ولذلك يُقَدَّمُ الدَّيْنُ الذى به الرَّهْنُ فى ثَمَنِه على ما تَعَلَّقَ بالذِّمَّةِ، ويُخالِفُ الرَّهْنَ؛ فإنَّه لا تَتَعَلَّقُ به مَصْلَحَةُ عَقْدِ الرَّهْنِ، والتَّسْلِيمُ هاهُنا يَتَعَلَّقُ به مَصْلَحَةُ عَقْدِ البَيْعِ. وأمَّا إذا كان الثَّمَنُ عَيْنًا، فقد تَعَلَّقَ الحَقُّ بعَيْنهِ أيضًا، كالمَبِيعِ، فاسْتَوَيا، وقد وجَبَ لكُلِّ واحدٍ مِنهما على صاحِبِه حَقٌّ، قد اسْتَحَقَّ قَبْضَه، فأُجبِرَ كُلُّ واحدٍ مِنهما على إيفاءِ صاحِبِه حَقّه (١٢). ووَجْهُ الرِّوايَةِ الأُخْرَى؛ أنّ الذى يَتَعَلَّقُ به اسْتِقْرارُ البَيْعِ وتمامُه هو المَبِيعُ (١٣)، فوَجَبَ تَقْدِيمُه. ولأنَّ الثَّمَنَ لا يَتَعَيَّنُ بالتَّعْيِينِ، فأشْبَهَ غيرَ المُعَيَّنِ. إذا ثَبَتَ هذا، وأوْجَبْنا التَّسْلِيمَ على البائِعِ، فسَلَّمَهُ، فلا يَخْلُو المُشْتَرِى مِن أنْ يَكُونَ مُوسِرًا، أو مُعْسِرًا، فإنْ كان مُوسِرًا والثَّمَنُ معه، أُجْبِرَ على تَسْلِيمِه، وإنْ كان غَائِبًا قَرِيبًا فى بَيْتِه أو بَلَدِه، حُجِرَ عليه فى المَبِيعِ وسائِرِ مالِه، حتى يُسَلِّمَ الثَّمَنَ، خَوْفًا مِن أنْ يَتَصَرَّفَ فى مالِه تَصَرُّفًا يَضُرُّ بالبائِعِ، وإنْ كان غَائِبًا عن البَلَدِ فى مسافةِ القَصْرِ، فالبائِعُ مُخَيَّرٌ بينَ أنْ يَصْبِرَ إلى أنْ يُوجَدَ، وبينَ فَسْخِ العَقْدِ؛ لأنَّه قد تَعَذَّرَ عليه الثَّمَنُ، فهو كالمُفْلِسِ، وإنْ كان دُونَ مسافةِ القَصْرِ، فله الخِيارُ فى أحدِ الوَجْهَيْنِ؛ لأنَّ فيه ضَرَرًا عليه. والثّانى، لا خِيارَ له؛ لأنَّ ما دُونَ مَسافةِ القَصْرِ بِمَنْزِلَةِ الحاضِرِ. وإنْ كان المُشْتَرِى مُعْسِرًا، فللبائِعِ الفَسْخُ فى الحالِ، والرُّجُوعُ فى المَبِيعِ. وهذا كُلُّه مذهبُ الشّافِعِىِّ. ويَقْوَى عِنْدِى أنَّه لا يَجِبُ عليه تَسْلِيمُ المَبِيعِ، حتى يُحْضِرَ الثَّمَنَ، ويَتَمَكَّنَ المُشْتَرِى مِن تَسْلِيمِه؛ لأنَّ البائِعَ إنّما رَضِىَ بِبَذْلِ المَبِيعِ بالثَّمَنِ، فلا يَلْزَمُه دَفْعُه قبلَ حُصُولِ عِوَضِه، ولأنَّ المُتَعاقِدَيْنِ سواءٌ فى المُعاوَضَةِ، فيَسْتَوِيانِ فى التَّسْلِيمِ، وإنَّما يُؤَثِّرُ ما ذُكِرَ مِن التَّرْجِيحِ فى تَقْدِيمِ التَّسْلِيمِ مع حُضُورِ العِوَضِ الآخَرِ؛ لعَدَمِ الضَّرَرِ فيه، وأمّا مع الخَطَرِ (١٤) المُحْوِجِ إلى الحَجْر، أو المَحْجُوزِ للفَسْخِ، فلا يَنْبَغِى أنْ يَثْبُتَ. ولأنَّ شَرْعَ
(١٢) سقط من: الأصل.(١٣) فى م: "البيع".(١٤) فى م: "الحظر".