occurs for the principal. Furthermore, the principal is not eligible to purchase him, so it is not valid for him to purchase him, just as if a Muslim were to appoint a dhimmi as an agent to purchase wine. If a Muslim appoints a disbeliever to purchase a Muslim for him (31), and he purchases him, there are two views regarding this. One is that it is valid, because the prohibition was only due to the fact that it entails the establishment of a disbeliever’s ownership over a Muslim, whereas here the ownership is established for the Muslim, so the prohibitory factor is not realized. The second view is that it is not valid, because that which is prohibited to purchase, it is prohibited to appoint an agent for, like the muhrim (one in the state of ihram) regarding the purchase of game, or a disbeliever regarding the marriage of a Muslim woman; and it is not permissible for a Muslim to be an agent for a dhimmi in the purchase of wine.

Section: If a disbeliever purchases a Muslim who becomes free through him by virtue of kinship, such as his father or his brother, the purchase is valid, and he is emancipated through him, according to the opinion of some of our companions. Abu al-Khattab narrated two reports regarding this; one of them is that it is not valid. This is the opinion of some of the companions, because it is a purchase through which he acquires ownership of a Muslim, so it is not valid, like [the purchase of] one who does not become free through him. Also, that which is prohibited to purchase, it is not permissible to purchase, even if the ownership ceases immediately after the purchase, like the muhrim’s purchase of game. The second [view] is that its purchase is valid, because the prohibition was only established due to the insult to the Muslim caused by a disbeliever’s ownership of him, and here the ownership ceases immediately after the purchase entirely, and the benefit of freedom obtained is many times greater than the insult resulting from ownership for a fleeting moment. It differs from one who does not become free through him, for his ownership would not cease except by his relinquishing it; similarly for the muhrim’s purchase of game, for if he were to own it, his ownership would be established over it and would not cease. If a disbeliever says to a Muslim: "Emancipate your slave on my behalf, and I shall bear his price," and he does so, it is valid; because his emancipation is not a transfer of ownership, but rather an annulment of the state of bondage, and the ownership only occurred in a legal sense (32), so it is permitted, just as he owns him through inheritance in a legal sense. Furthermore, the benefit of freedom that he obtains outweighs the harm resulting from ownership, so it becomes as if it were non-existent. There is another view that it is not valid, based on the [analogy of the] purchase of his Muslim relative.