"The believers are bound by their conditions" (8). Furthermore, the two contracting parties possess the right of disposal over this contract through cancellation (iqala) and ratification, thus they possess the right to add to it, just like the option of the session (khiyar al-majlis). Abu Hanifa said regarding a loan and the replacement of destroyed property that it is like our position, but regarding the price of sold goods, wages, dowry, and compensation for khul', it is like their position; because a term (ajal) necessitates a portion of the compensation, and a loan does not admit of increase or decrease in its compensation, and the replacement for destroyed property is the equivalent (mithl) without increase or decrease; therefore it does not become deferred, while the rest of the compensations permit increase, so their deferment is permissible. Our position is that the right is established immediately, and the deferment is a charitable act and a promise from him, so it is not obligatory to fulfill, as if he had lent him something. This does not fall under the definition of a "condition," and even if it is named such, the report is specified for (lending for use) (ariyah), so that which they disagreed upon is joined to it because it is similar to it. Our position against Abu Hanifa is that it is an addition [made] after the finalization of the contract, so it resembles a loan. As for iqala, it is an annulment and the initiation of a new contract, unlike our issue. As for the option of the session, it is in the position of initiating the contract, evidenced by the fact that taking possession (qabd) is valid therein for what requires possession, and specification (ta'ayyun) for what is in the liability (dhimma).
Section: It is permissible to loan measurable (makil) and weighable (mawzun) items without disagreement. Ibn al-Mundhir said: All of the scholars we retain [the views of] have reached a consensus that taking a loan of that which has an equivalent among measurable and weighable items and foodstuffs is permissible. It is permissible to loan everything that is established in the liability (dhimma) as a forward sale (salam), except for human beings. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: It is not permissible to loan anything other than measurable and weighable items, because it has no equivalent, resembling jewels. Our position is that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) took a loan of a young camel, and it is neither measurable nor weighable. Furthermore, because that which is established as a forward sale is owned via sale and determined by description, its loan is therefore permissible, like measurable and weighable items. Their statement that "it has no equivalent" contradicts their own principle, for according to Abu Hanifa, if someone destroys a garment for a man, an equivalent is established in his liability, and it is permissible to settle for more than its value. As for that which is not established in the liability as a forward sale, such as jewels and their like, the Qadi said: It is permissible to loan them,
(8) Its takhrij (documentation) was provided previously on page 30.
"المُؤْمِنُونَ عِنْدَ شُرُوطِهِمْ" (٨). ولأنَّ المُتَعَاقِدَيْنِ يَمْلِكَانِ التَّصَرُّفَ فى هذا العَقْدِ بالإقَالَةِ والإمْضَاءِ، فمَلَكَا الزِّيادَةَ فيه، كخِيَارِ المَجْلِسِ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ فى القَرْضِ وبَدَلِ المُتْلَفِ كقَوْلِنَا، وفى ثَمَنِ المَبِيعِ والأُجْرَةِ والصَّدَاقِ وعِوَضِ الخُلْعِ كقَوْلِهِمَا؛ لأنَّ الأَجَلَ يَقْتَضِى جُزْءًا من العِوَضِ، والقَرْضُ لا يَحْتَمِلُ الزِّيَادَةَ والنَّقْصَ فى عِوَضِه، وبَدَلُ المُتْلَفِ الوَاجِبِ فيه المِثْلُ من غير زِيَادَةٍ ولا نَقْصٍ؛ فلذلك لم يَتَأَجَّلْ، وبَقِيَّةُ الأعْواضِ يجوزُ الزِّيادَةُ فيها، فجَازَ تَأَجِيلُها. ولَنا، أنَّ الحَقَّ يَثْبُتُ حَالًّا، والتَّأَجِيلُ تَبَرُّعٌ منه وَوَعْدٌ، فلا يَلْزَمُ الوَفاءُ به، كما لو أعَارَه شيئا، وهذا لا يَقَعُ عليه اسْمُ الشَّرْطِ ولو سُمِّىَ، فالخَبَرُ مَخْصُوصٌ بالعَارِيَّةِ فيَلْحَقُ به ممَّا اخْتَلَفَا فيه؛ لأنَّه مِثْلُه. ولَنا, على أبى حَنِيفَةَ أنَّها زِيَادَةٌ وبعد اسْتِقْرَارِ العَقْدِ, فأَشْبَه القَرْضَ، وأمَّا الإقَالَةُ: فهى فَسْخٌ وابْتِدَاءُ عَقْدٍ آخَرَ، بِخِلَافِ مَسْألَتِنَا، وأمَّا خِيَارُ المَجْلِسِ، فهو بمَنْزِلَةِ ابْتِداءِ العَقْدِ، بِدَلِيلِ أنه يُجْزِىءُ فيه القَبْضُ لما يُشْتَرَطُ قَبْضُه، والتَّعَيُّن لما فى الذِّمَّةِ.
فصل: ويجوزُ قَرْضُ المَكِيلِ والمَوْزُونِ بغير خِلَافٍ. قال ابن المُنْذِرِ: أجْمَعَ كلُّ مَن نَحْفَظُ عنه من أهْلِ العِلْمِ، على أن اسْتِقْرَاضَ مَالَهُ مِثْلٌ من المَكِيلِ والمَوْزُونِ والأَطْعِمَةِ جَائِزٌ. ويَجُوزُ قَرْضُ كلِّ ما يَثْبُتُ فى الذِّمَّةِ سَلَمًا، سِوَى بَنِى آدَمَ. وبهذا قال الشَّافِعِىُّ وقال أبو حنيفةَ: لا يجوزُ قَرْضُ غير المَكِيلِ والمَوْزُونِ، لأنَّه لا مِثْلَ له، أشْبَهَ الجَوَاهِرَ. ولَنا، أنَّ النَّبِيَّ -صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ- اسْتَسْلَفَ بَكْرًا، وليس بمَكِيلٍ ولا مَوْزُونٍ. ولأنَّ ما يَثْبُتُ سَلَمًا، يُمْلَكُ بالبَيْعِ ويُضْبَطُ بالوَصْفِ، فجَازَ قَرْضُه، كالمَكِيلِ والمَوْزُونِ. وقولُهم: لا مِثْلَ له. خِلَافُ أصْلِهِم، فإنَّ عندَ أبى حنيفةَ، لو أَتْلَفَ على رَجُلٍ ثَوبًا، ثَبَتَ فى ذِمَّتِه مِثْلُه، ويجوزُ الصُّلْحُ عنه بأَكْثَرَ من قِيمَتِه. فأما ما لا يَثْبُتُ فى الذِّمَّةِ سَلَما، كالجَوَاهِرِ وشبهها، فقال القاضى: يجُوزُ قَرْضُها،
(٨) تقدم تخريجه فى صفحة ٣٠.