The borrower returns the value (qima); because that which has no equivalent is guaranteed by its value, and jewels are like others in terms of value. Abu al-Khattab said: It is not permissible to loan them; because the loan requires the return of the equivalent (mithl), and these have no equivalent. Furthermore, their loaning has not been reported, nor are they in the meaning of that for which the loan has been reported, as they are not among the conveniences (marafiq), nor are they established in the liability as a forward sale, so it was obligatory to keep them under the ruling of prohibition. It is possible to base this disagreement on the two opinions regarding that which is obligatory as a replacement for non-measurable and non-weighable items. So if we say: The obligation is to return the equivalent, it is not permissible to loan jewels and that which is not established in the liability as a forward sale, due to the impossibility of returning their equivalent. And if we say: The obligation is to return the value, it is permissible to loan it, due to the possibility of returning the value. For the companions of al-Shafi'i, there are two views similar to these.

Section: As for human beings, Ahmad said: I dislike their loaning. This admits the possibility of it being a dislike of discouragement (tanzih), and their loaning is valid, which is the opinion of Ibn Jurayj and al-Muzani; because it is wealth established in the liability as a forward sale, so its loaning is valid, like the rest of the livestock. It also admits the possibility that he meant the dislike of prohibition (tahrim), so their loaning is not valid. The Qadi chose this; because their loaning was not reported, nor are they among the conveniences. It also admits the possibility of the validity of loaning male slaves, but not female slaves. This is the opinion of Malik and al-Shafi'i, unless he loans them to those who are their unmarriageable kin (mahram), because the ownership via loan is weak, as it does not prevent him from returning it to the lender, so sexual intercourse is not rendered lawful by it, like ownership during the option period. If intercourse is not rendered lawful, the loan is not valid, due to the lack of any scholar who differentiates [between them], and because private parts (abdha') are matters for which precaution is taken. If we permitted their loaning, it would lead to a man borrowing a female slave, then having intercourse with her, and returning her that same day; whenever he needed to have intercourse with her, he would borrow her, have intercourse with her, and then return her, just as he borrows an object, benefits from it, and then returns it. Our position is that it is a contract that transfers ownership, so male and female slaves are equal in it, like the rest of the contracts. We do not concede the weakness of the ownership; for it is absolute for all types of disposal, unlike ownership during the option period. Their statement: "Whenever the borrower wishes, he returns her," is rejected; for when we say: The obligation is to return the value, the borrower does not own the right to return the female slave; rather, he returns her value. And even if we concede that, when the borrower intends this, his action would not be lawful, nor would his borrowing be valid, just as if he purchased a female slave to have intercourse with her and then return her.