it is a prioritization of the mortgagee with its price, and he does not have the right to prioritize some of his creditors over others. If he is interdicted due to feeblemindedness (safah), his ruling is the same as the one whose intellect has ceased due to insanity, according to what we have previously mentioned. If he faints, the mortgagee does not have the right to take possession of the pledge, nor does anyone else have the right to hand it over; for the person who has fainted has no authority over himself. If the mortgagee faints, no one else has the right to stand in his place in taking possession of the pledge either. His recovery is awaited. If he is mute and possesses understandable writing or known signaling, his ruling is the ruling of those who can speak; if he gives permission for possession, it is permissible, otherwise it is not. If his signaling and writing are not understood, possession is not permissible. If one of these people had given permission for possession, his ruling is the ruling of one who has not given permission, because their permission becomes void through what has afflicted them. All of this is encompassed by the statement of Al-Khiraqi: "from one whose action is valid." And none of these people have a valid action.

Section: If the pledger disposes of the pledge before possession, through gift, sale, manumission, designating it as a dower, or pledging it a second time, the first pledge becomes void, regardless of whether he took possession of the gift, the sold item, or the second pledge, or did not take possession of them; because he has removed it from the possibility of satisfying the debt from its price, or he has done what indicates his intent to do so. If he designates the slave as a mudabbar (to be freed upon his death), rents it out, or marries off the slave-girl, the pledge does not become void; because this disposal does not prevent the sale, so it does not prevent the validity of the pledge. Moreover, it does not prevent the initiation of the pledge, so it does not sever its continuation, just like using it. If he enters into a mukataba (emancipation contract) with the slave, it is built upon the validity of pledging a mukatab slave; if we say: his pledging is permissible, his pledge does not become void. If we say: his pledging is not permissible, his pledge becomes void, just as if he had manumitted him.

Section: The continuation of possession is a condition for the binding nature of the pledge. So, if the mortgagee removes it from his hand by his own choice, the binding nature of the pledge ceases, and the contract remains as if no possession had occurred in it, regardless of whether he removed it by renting, lending, depositing, or otherwise. If he returns and gives it back to him, the binding nature returns by the authority of the previous contract.