with their presence, he is liable, and the taker is also liable. If they refuse, and he does not find a judge, he leaves it with another neutral party and is not liable. If one of them refuses, he does not have the right to hand it over to the other; if he does so, he is liable. The difference between the two cases is that one of them holds it for himself, while the neutral party holds it for both of them. This applies if they are both present. As for when they are both absent, you should look: if the neutral party has a valid excuse, such as illness, travel, or the like, he refers it to the judge, who takes possession of it from him or appoints a neutral party to hold it for them both. If he does not find a judge, he deposits it with a trustworthy person (11). He does not have the right to hand it over to a trustworthy person to hold it for him while a judge is available; if he does so, he is liable. If he has no excuse and the absence is a long distance (to the extent of the travel distance for shortening prayers), the judge shall take possession of it from him; if he finds no judge, he hands it over to a neutral party. If the absence is less than the distance for shortening prayers, it is as if they were present, because less than the distance for shortening prayers is considered equivalent to being in residence. If one of them is present and the other is absent, their ruling is the same as that of the two absent parties, and he does not have the right to hand it over to the one who is present. In all these categories, whenever he hands it over to one of them, he is obligated to return it to his (the neutral party's) custody; if he does not, he is liable for the right of the other party.

Section: If the pledge is in the hands of a neutral party (12), and they both stipulate that he shall sell it upon the due date of the debt, this is valid, and his sale is valid. Abu Hanifah, Malik, and al-Shafi'i held this view. If the pledgor dismisses the neutral party from the task of selling, the dismissal is valid, and he no longer has the power to sell. This is the view of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifah and Malik said: He is not dismissed, because his agency has become one of the rights of the pledge, so the pledgor does not have the right to revoke it, like his other rights. Ibn Abi Musa said: The same applies to our school; for Ahmad has prohibited trickery (hilah) in more than one place in his books, and this opens the door to trickery for the pledgor, as he stipulates this for the pledgee to get him to agree, then he dismisses him. The first view is the one explicitly stated by him, because agency is a discretionary (permissible) contract, so he is not compelled to remain in it, like all other agencies. The fact that it is among the rights of the pledgor does not prevent its permissibility, just as if they were to stipulate a pledge in a sale, it does not become binding.