789 - Issue; He said: "And if the pledger manumits his pledged slave, he becomes free, and if [the pledger] has wealth, the value of the manumitted [slave] is taken, and it becomes a pledge."
The totality of this is that the pledger has no right to manumit the pledge because it invalidates the mortgagee's right to the security. If he does manumit, the manumission takes effect, whether he is solvent (musir) or insolvent (mu'sir). Ahmad explicitly stated this, and it is the view of Sharik, al-Hasan ibn Salih, the People of Reason (Ahl al-Ra'y), and al-Shafi'i in one of his statements. However, Abu Hanifa said: "The slave is to strive for his value (yastas'i) if the manumitter is insolvent." There is another narration from Ahmad: the manumission of an insolvent person does not take effect. Al-Sharif Abu Ja'far mentioned this, and it is the opinion of Malik and the second opinion of al-Shafi'i, because his manumission causes the loss of the mortgagee's right to the security, both in the essence of the pledge and its equivalent; thus, it does not take effect due to the harm it causes the mortgagee. Furthermore, it is a manumission that invalidates the right of one other than the owner, so it only takes effect from a solvent person, not an insolvent one, similar to the manumission of a share one owns in a slave. 'Ata', al-Batti, and Abu Thawr said: The manumission of the pledger does not take effect, whether he is solvent or insolvent. This is the third opinion of al-Shafi'i, because it is an act that invalidates the right of security from the pledge, so it does not take effect, just like a sale.
Our argument is that this is a manumission from an owner who is permitted to dispose of his property and has full ownership, so it takes effect, like the manumission of a lessee. Furthermore, a pledge is an asset held for the fulfillment of a right, so the owner's manumission takes effect regarding it, as in the case of an item sold that is still in the hands of the seller. Manumission differs from sale, as it is based on the principle of preponderance (taghlib) and propagation (sirayah), it takes effect on the property of others, and it is permissible to manumit an item sold before it is possessed, a runaway slave, an unknown slave, or one that cannot be delivered, and it is permissible to suspend it on conditions, unlike a sale. Once this is established, if he is solvent, its value is taken from him and made a pledge in its place, because he invalidated the right of security without the mortgagee's permission, so he is held liable for its value, just as if an outsider had invalidated it, or as if he had destroyed it. The value becomes the pledge because it is a substitute for the essence [of the pledge] and its equivalent. If he is insolvent, the value remains as a liability on his conscience. If he becomes solvent before the right [the debt] is due, the value is taken from him and made a pledge, unless he chooses to expedite the payment of the right, in which case he pays it and there is no need for a pledge.
(1) In [copies] A and M: "hadd" (limit).
٧٨٩ - مسألة؛ قال: (وَإذَا أَعْتَقَ الرَّاهِنُ عَبْدَهُ المَرْهُونَ، فَقَدْ صَارَ حُرًّا، ويُؤْخَذُ إنْ كَانَ لَهُ مالٌ بِقِيمَةِ المُعْتَقِ، فَيَكُونُ رَهْنًا)
وجُمْلَةُ ذلك أنَّه ليس لِلرَّاهِنِ عِتْقُ الرَّهْنِ؛ لأنَّه يُبْطِلُ حَقَّ المُرْتَهِنِ مِن الوَثِيقَةِ، فإن أَعْتَقَ، نَفَذَ عِتْقُه مُوسِرًا كان أو مُعْسِرًا. نَصَّ عليه أحمدُ، وبه قال شَرِيكٌ، والحَسَنُ بن صَالِحٍ، وأصْحابُ الرَّأْىِ، والشَّافِعِيُّ في أحَدِ أقْوَالِه، إلَّا أنَّ أبا حنيفةَ قال: يَسْتَسْعِى العَبْدَ في قِيمَتِه إن كان المُعْتِقُ مُعْسِرًا. وعن أحْمَدَ رِوَايَةٌ أُخْرَى: لا يَنْفُذُ عِتْقُ المُعْسِرِ. ذَكَرَها الشَّرِيفُ أبو جعفرٍ. وهو قولُ مَالِكٍ، والقولُ الثاني لِلشَّافِعِيِّ؛ لأنَّ عِتْقَه يُسْقِطُ حَقَّ المُرْتَهِنِ من الوَثِيقَةِ، من عَيْنِ الرَّهْنِ وبَدَلِهَا، فلم يَنْفُذْ، لما فيه من الإِضْرَارِ بالمُرْتَهِنِ، ولأنَّه عِتْقٌ يُبْطِلُ حَقَّ غيرِ المالِكِ، فنَفَذَ من المُوسِرِ دون المُعْسِرِ، كعِتْقِ شِرْكٍ له مِن عَبْدٍ. وقال عَطَاءٌ، والبَتِّيُّ، وأبو ثَوْرٍ: لا يَنْفُذُ عِتْقُ الرَّاهِنِ مُوسِرًا كان أو مُعْسِرًا. وهو القولُ الثالثُ للشَّافِعيِّ؛ لأنَّه مَعْنًى يُبْطِلُ حَقَّ (١) الوَثِيقَةِ من الرَّهْنِ، فلم يَنْفُذْ كالبَيْعِ. ولَنا، أنَّه إعْتَاقٌ من مَالِكٍ جَائِزِ التَّصَرُّفِ تَامِّ المِلْكِ، فنَفَذَ، كعِتْقِ المُسْتَأْجِرِ، ولأنَّ الرَّهْنَ عَيْنٌ مَحْبُوسَةٌ لاسْتِيفَاءِ الحَقِّ، فنَفَذَ فيها عِتْقُ المالِكِ، كالمَبِيعِ في يَدِ البَائِعِ، والعِتْقُ يُخَالِفُ البَيْعَ، فإنَّه مَبْنِيٌّ على التَّغْلِيبِ والسِّرايَةِ، ويَنْفُذُ في مِلْكِ الغيرِ، ويجوزُ عِتْقُ المَبِيعِ قبلَ قَبْضِه، والآبِقِ، والمَجْهُولِ، وما لا يَقْدِرُ على تَسْلِيمِه، ويجوزُ تَعْلِيقُه على الشُّرُوطِ، بِخِلَافِ البَيْعِ. إذا ثَبَتَ هذا فإنَّه إن كان مُوسِرًا أُخِذَتْ منه قِيمَتُه، فجُعِلَتْ مَكَانَه رَهْنًا؛ لأنَّه أبْطَلَ حَقَّ الوَثِيقَةِ بغيرِ إذْنِ المُرْتَهِنِ، فَلَزِمَتْهُ قِيمَتُه، كما لو أبْطَلَها أَجْنَبِيٌّ، أو كما لو أتْلَفَه، وتكونُ القِيمَةُ رَهْنًا؛ لأنَّها نَائِبَةٌ عن العَيْنِ، وبَدَلٌ عنها، وإن كان مُعْسِرًا فالقِيمَةُ في ذِمَّتِه، فإنْ أيْسَرَ قبلَ حُلُولِ الحَقِّ، أُخِذَتْ منه القِيمَةُ فَجُعِلَتْ رَهْنًا، إلَّا أن يَخْتَارَ تَعْجِيلَ الحَقِّ، فيَقْضِيَه، ولا يَحْتَاجُ إلى رَهْنٍ،
(١) في أ، م: "حد".