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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 6 · صفحة 483فصل

الترجمة · EN

And if he becomes solvent after the right [the debt] is due, he is demanded to pay the debt specifically, because his liability is discharged by this regarding both rights simultaneously. The calculation is based on the value of the slave at the time of manumission, because that is the time of destruction [of the pledge]. This is the position of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said, regarding the insolvent person: "The slave is to strive for his value, then [the slave] has recourse against the pledger." In this, there is an imposition of earnings on the slave, yet he has no agency and committed no crime; imposing the penalty on the one from whom the destruction originated is more appropriate, as in the case of solvency and like all other [cases of] destruction.

Section: If he manumits [the slave] with the permission of the mortgagee, we know of no disagreement regarding the validity of his manumission in any case, because the prohibition was for the sake of the mortgagee's right, and he has permitted it. His right to the security drops, whether the manumitter is solvent or insolvent, because he permitted what contradicts his right; thus, when it occurs, his right ceases to exist, and he has consented to it by consenting to what contradicts it and permitting it, so there is no substitute for it. If he retracts the permission before the manumission, and the pledger knows of his retraction, [it is as if he had not permitted it. If the pledger knew of his retraction] and manumitted [the slave], there are two perspectives, based on [the issue of] the dismissal of an agent without his knowledge. If he retracts it after the manumission, his retraction is of no benefit. The statement [to be accepted] is the statement of the mortgagee, supported by his oath, because the original state is the absence of permission. If the pledger and the heirs of the mortgagee disagree, the statement of the mortgagee's heirs is also accepted, except that their oaths are regarding the negation of knowledge, because it pertains to the action of another. If the mortgagee and the heirs of the pledger disagree, the statement of the mortgagee is accepted, supported by his oath; if he does not take the oath, judgment is passed against him due to his refusal [to swear].

Section: If the pledger disposes of the pledge through means other than manumission—such as sale, leasing, gifting, endowment, pledging it to another, and so on—his disposal is void, because it is a disposal that invalidates the mortgagee's right to the security and is not based on the principle of preponderance and propagation; thus, it is invalid without the mortgagee's permission, like the dissolution of the pledge. If the mortgagee permits it, it becomes valid, and the pledge is voided, because he permitted what contradicts his right, so it is voided by his action, just like manumission. If he marries off the pledged slave girl, it is not valid. This is the choice of

الحواشي

(2) In [copy] M: "fayasqutu" (so it drops). (3) Omitted from: M. (4) In [copies] A and M: "al-umm" (the mother).

العربية (المصدر)

وإن أَيْسَرَ بعدَ حُلُولِ الحَقِّ، طُولِبَ بالدَّيْنِ خاصَّةً، لأنَّ ذِمَّتَه تَبْرَأُ به مِن الحَقَّيْنِ معا، والاعْتِبَارُ بِقِيمَةِ العَبْدِ حالَ الإِعْتَاقِ، لأنَّه حَالُ الإِتْلَافِ. وبهذا قال الشَّافِعِيُّ، وقال أبو حنيفة، في المُعْسِرِ: يَسْتَسْعِى العَبْدَ في قِيمَتِه، ثم يَرْجِعُ على الرَّاهِنِ. وفيه إيجَابُ الكَسْبِ على العَبْدِ، ولا صُنْعَ له، ولا جِنَايَةَ منه، وإِلْزَامُ الغُرْمِ لمن وُجِدَ منه الإِتْلَافُ أَوْلَى، كحالِ اليَسَارِ، وكسائِرِ الإِتْلَافِ.

فصل: وإن أَعْتَقَهُ بإذْنِ المُرْتَهِنِ، فلا نَعْلَمُ خِلَافًا في نُفُوذِ عَتْقِه على كلِّ حالٍ؛ لأنَّ المَنْعَ كان لِحَقِّ المُرْتَهِنِ، وقد أَذِنَ، ويسْقُطُ (٢) حَقُّه من الوَثِيقَةِ مُوسِرًا كان المُعْتِقُ أو مُعْسِرًا، لأنَّه أَذِنَ فيما يُنَافِى حَقَّه، فإذا وُجِدَ، زَالَ حَقُّهُ، وقد رَضِىَ به لِرِضَاهُ بما يُنَافِيه، وإذْنِه فيه، فلم يَكُنْ له بَدَلٌ. فإن رَجَعَ عن الإِذْنِ قبلَ العِتْقِ، وعَلِمَ الرَّاهِنُ بِرُجُوعِه [كان كمَن لم يأْذَنْ، فإنْ عَلِمَ الرَّاهِنُ برُجُوعِه] (٣)، فأَعْتَقَ، ففيه وَجْهانِ، بنَاءً على عَزْلِ الوَكِيلِ بدُونِ عِلْمِه. وإن رَجَعَ بعدَ العِتْقِ، لم يَنْفَعْ رُجُوعُه، والقولُ قولُ المُرْتَهِنِ مع يَمِينِه؛ لأنَّ الأصْلَ عَدَمُ الإِذْنِ. ولو اخْتَلَفَ الرَّاهِنُ وَوَرَثَةُ المُرْتَهِنِ، فالقولُ قولُ وَرَثَةِ المُرْتَهِنِ أيضا، إلَّا أنَّ أيْمَانَهُم على نَفْى العِلْمِ، لأنَّها على فِعْلِ الغيرِ. وإن اخْتَلَفَ المُرْتَهِنُ وَوَرَثَةُ الرَّاهِنِ، فالقولُ قولُ المُرْتَهِنِ مع يَمِينهِ، وإن لم يَحْلِفْ، قُضِىَ عليه بالنُّكُولِ.

فصل: وإن تَصَرَّفَ الرَّاهِنُ. بغير العِتْقِ، كالبَيْعِ، والإِجَارَةِ، والهِبَةِ، والوَقْفِ، والرَّهْنِ، وغيرِه، فتَصَرُّفُه باطِلٌ؛ لأنَّه تَصَرُّفٌ يُبْطُل حَقَّ المُرْتَهِنِ مِن الوَثِيقَةِ، غيرُ مَبْنِيٍّ على التَّغْلِيبِ والسِّرَايَةِ، فلم يَصِحَّ بغيرِ إذْنِ المُرْتَهِنِ، كَفَسْخِ الرَّهْنِ. فإن أذِنَ فيه المُرْتَهِنُ، صَحَّ، وبَطَلَ الرَّهْنُ؛ لأنَّه أَذِنَ فيما يُنَافِى حَقَّه، فيَبْطُلُ بِفِعْلِه، كالعِتْقِ. وإن زَوَّجَ الأمَةَ (٤) المَرْهُونَةَ، لم يَصِحَّ. وهذا اخْتِيَارُ

الحواشي

(٢) في م: "فيسقط".(٣) سقط من: م.(٤) في أ، م: "الأم".

السابقمجلد 6 · صفحة 483التالي
السابق6·483التالي