The master has the right of retaliation, for it is his right, and it is established only to be exacted. If he exacts retaliation, the value of the lesser of the two is taken from him and is placed as a pledge in its stead. Ahmad explicitly stated this in the narration of Ibn Mansur, and it is the opinion of Ishaq. It is also derived that nothing is incumbent upon him. This is the school of al-Shafi'i, because no property is necessitated by the offense, nor is it entitled by any means, and it is not upon the pledgor to strive for the mortgagee in earning wealth. Our position is that he destroyed property that became entitled by reason of the destruction of the pledge, so he owes its value, just as if the offense were one necessitating wealth. Such is the ruling if retaliation is established for the master against his mortgaged slave. We have required the lesser of the two values because the right of the mortgagee is only connected to the financial value, and the amount of wealth required is the lesser of the two values; for if the pledge were less, no more than its value would be required, and if the offender were less, no more than its value would be required. If he pardons for wealth, his pardon is valid, and the lesser of the two values becomes due, for the reason we mentioned. This is if the retaliation is for killing. If it is for a wound, the extraction of a tooth, or the like, then what is due upon pardon is the lesser of the two matters: the indemnity (arsh) of the wound or the value of the offender. If he pardons unconditionally, or for something other than wealth, this is based upon what is considered the requirement of intentional injury. If we say: its requirement is one of two things, then wealth is established. If we say: its requirement is retaliation in itself, then its ruling is the same as if he had retaliated. If we say there: his value is required from the pledgor, then it is required here. This is the choice of Abu al-Khattab, because he caused the loss of the pledge's substitute by his action, resembling the situation if he had retaliated. If we say: nothing is required of the pledgor there, then nothing is required here. This is the opinion of the Qadi and the school of al-Shafi'i, because it is an acquisition of wealth, so he is not forced to do it. As for if the offense necessitates wealth, or if wealth is established by pardoning the offense that necessitates retaliation, then the right of the pledgor and the mortgagee becomes connected to it. It shall be in the common currency of the land, like the values of destroyed items. If the pledgor wants to settle for it or take an animal in its place, it is not permissible without the permission of the mortgagee. If he permits it, it is permissible, because the right belongs to them both and does not exit from them. Whatever is received of anything is a pledge, as a substitute for the first, acting on its behalf and standing in its place.