Section: If the pledge is livestock that requires mating with a male, the pledger shall not be compelled to do so, because he is not responsible for that which would result in an increase in the pledge, and this is not something required for its survival. He is not prevented from doing so either, as it is an increase for both of them, and there is no harm to the pledgee in it. If it requires grazing, it is the responsibility of the pledger to provide a shepherd for it, because that is treated in the same manner as its fodder. If the pledger wishes to travel with it in order to graze it in another place, and it has enough pasture in its current location to maintain its condition, the pledgee may prevent him from doing so, because traveling with it removes it from his sight and custody. If its location becomes barren and it cannot find sustenance to maintain its condition, the pledger may travel with it, as this is a situation of necessity, for it would perish if he did not travel with it, except that it must be in the hands of a just person whom they both approve of or whom the judge appoints, and the pledger shall not take it alone. If the pledger refuses to travel with it, the pledgee may transport it, because leaving it would lead to its destruction and the loss of his right from the pledger. If they both wish to travel with it and disagree on the location, we give priority to the statement of the one who identifies the most beneficial place. If they are equal, we give priority to the statement of the pledgee. Al-Shafi'i said: The statement of the pledger is given priority, even if the most beneficial place is elsewhere, because he has the right of ownership over it, unless its shelter is in the hands of a just person. Our position is that the custody belongs to the pledgee, so he is more entitled, as if they were both in the same town. Neither of them may move it from the town while it is fertile, whether he intends to move it to a similar place or one more fertile, as there is no point in traveling with the pledge when it is possible to avoid doing so. If they agree on moving it, that is also permissible, whether it is more beneficial for it or not, because the right belongs to both of them and does not fall outside of them.
Section: If it is a slave who requires circumcision and the debt is due immediately or its term expires before he recovers, he is prevented from it, because it decreases his value and involves harm. If he will recover before the debt is due and the weather is moderate and there is no fear for him, he may do so, because it is one of the obligatory acts, and it increases his value, and it does not harm the pledgee, and his expenses are the responsibility of the pledger. If he becomes ill and requires medicine, the pledger shall not be compelled to provide it, because it is certain that it is a means for his survival, yet he might recover without treatment, unlike maintenance. If the pledger wishes to treat him with medicine that causes no harm, he shall not be prevented, because it is in the interest of both without harming either. If the medicine is of the type whose consequences are feared, such as poisons, the pledgee may prevent him from using it, because he cannot be certain that it will not cause his death. If he requires phlebotomy (opening of the veins), or the animal requires 'tawdij', which means opening the two jugular veins
فصل: وإن كان الرَّهْنُ مَاشِيَةً تَحْتَاجُ إلى إطْرَاقِ الفَحْلِ، لم يُجْبَرِ الرَّاهِنُ عليه؛ لأنَّه ليس عليه ما يَتَضَمَّنُ زِيَادَةً فى الرَّهْنِ، وليس ذلك ممَّا يَحْتَاجُ إليه لِبَقَائِها، ولا يُمْنَعُ من ذلك؛ لِكَوْنِها زِيَادَةً لهما، لا ضَرَرَ على المُرْتَهِنِ فيه. وإن احْتَاجَتْ إلى رَعْىٍ، فعلَى الرَّاهِنِ أن يُقِيمَ لها رَاعِيًا؛ لأنَّ ذلك يَجْرِى مَجْرَى عَلْفِها. وإن أرَادَ الرَّاهِنُ السَّفَرَ بها لِيَرْعَاهَا فى مكان آخَرَ، وكان لها فى مَكَانِها مَرْعًى تَتَمَاسَكُ به، فِللْمُرْتَهِنِ مَنْعُه من ذلك؛ لأنَّ فى السَّفَرِ بها إِخْرَاجَها عن نَظَرِه ويَدِه. وإن أجْدَبَ مَكانُها، فلم يَجِدْ ما تَتَمَاسَكُ به فلِلرَّاهِنِ السَّفَرُ بها؛ لأنَّه مَوْضِعُ ضَرُورَةٍ، لأنَّها تَهْلَكُ إذا لم يُسَافِرْ بها، إلَّا أنَّها تكونُ فى يَدِ عَدْلٍ يَرْضَيَانِ به، أو يَنْصِبُه الحاكِمُ، ولا يَنْفَرِدُ الرَّاهِنُ بها، فإن امْتَنَعَ الرَّاهِنُ من السَّفَرِ بها، فلِلْمُرْتَهِنِ نَقْلُها؛ لأنَّ فى بَقَائِها هَلَاكَها، وضَيَاعَ حَقِّه من الرَّاهِنِ. فإن أرَادَا جَمِيعًا السَّفَرَ بها، واخْتَلَفَا فى مَكَانِها، قَدَّمْنَا قَوْلَ مَن يُعَيِّنُ الأَصْلَحَ، فإن اسْتَوَيَا، قَدَّمْنَا قَوْلَ المُرْتَهِنِ. وقال الشَّافِعِىُّ: يُقَدَّمُ قولُ الرَّاهِنِ، وإن كان الأصْلَحُ غيرَه؛ لأنَّه أمْلَكُ بها، إلَّا أن يكونَ مَأْوَاها إلى يَدِ عَدْلٍ. ولَنا، أنَّ اليَدَ لِلْمُرْتَهِنِ، فكان أوْلَى، كما لو كانا فى بَلَدٍ واحِدٍ، وأيُّهما أرَادَ نَقْلَها عن البَلَدِ مِع خِصْبِه لم يكُنْ له، سواءٌ أرَادَ نَقْلَها إلى مِثْلِه، أو أخْصَبَ منه، إذ لا مَعْنَى لِلمُسَافَرَةِ بالرَّهْنِ مع إمكانِ تَرْكِ السَّفَرِ به. وإن اتَّفَقَا على نَقْلِهَا، جَازَ أيضا، سواءٌ كان أنْفَعَ لها أو لا؛ لأنَّ الحَقَّ لهما، لا يَخْرُجُ عنهما.
فصل: وإن كان عَبْدًا يَحْتَاجُ إلى خِتَانٍ، والدَّيْنُ حَالٌّ، أو أجَلُهُ قبلَ بُرْئِه، مُنِعَ منه؛ لأنَّه يَنْقُصُ ثَمَنُه، وفيه ضَرَرٌ، وإن كان يَبْرَأُ قبلَ مَحلِّ الحَقِّ، والزَّمَانُ مُعْتَدِلٌ لا يخَافُ عليه فيه، فلَهُ ذلك؛ لأنَّه من الوَاجِباتِ، ويَزِيدُ به الثَّمَنُ، ولا يَضُرُّ المُرْتَهِنَ، ومُؤْنَتُه على الرَّاهِنِ. فإن مَرِضَ، فاحْتَاجَ إلى دَوَاءٍ، لم يُجْبَرِ الرَّاهِنُ عليه؛ لأنَّه يَتَحَقَّقُ أنَّه سَبَبٌ لِبَقَائِه، وقد يَبْرَأُ بغير عِلَاجٍ، بِخِلَافِ النَّفَقَةِ. وإن أرَادَ الرَّاهِنُ مُدَاوَاتَه بما لا ضَرَرَ فيه، لم يُمْنَعْ منه؛ لأنَّه مَصْلَحَةٌ لهما من غيرِ ضَرَرٍ بواحِدٍ منهما. وإن كان الدَّوَاءُ ممَّا يُخَافُ غَائِلَتُه، كالسُّمُومِ، فلِلْمُرْتَهِنِ مَنْعُه منه؛ لأنَّه لا يَأْمَنُ تَلَفَه. وإن احْتَاجَ إلى فَصْدٍ، أو احْتَاجَتِ الدَّابّةُ إلى تَوْدِيجٍ، ومَعْناه فَتْحُ الوَدَجَيْنِ
