what he did which came between him and the person for whom he made the admission, and thus he becomes liable for its value, as we have said. The Qadi said: If he admits ownership to someone other than the person in whose possession it is, are the possessor or the one to whom the admission was made entitled to reclaim it? There are two views. If he admits it to one of them while it is in the possession of both, the possession of the one to whom the admission was made is established [in the half], and regarding the other half, there are two views.

Section: If the pledgor is given permission to sell the pledge after the debt has become due, it is permitted, and his right attaches to its price. If he is given permission before the debt becomes due, without qualification, and he sells it, the pledge is nullified, and he is not liable for its substitute; for he permitted him to do that which contradicts his right, so it is like the case where he permits him to manumit it, and the owner is entitled to take its price. Al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifa and Muhammad said: The price becomes a pledge; for the pledgor sold the pledge with the permission of the pledgee, so it is required that his right be established therein, just as if the debt had become due. Al-Tahawi said: The right of the pledgee is attached to the essence of the pledge, and the price is its substitute, so it must be attached to it, just as if it were destroyed by a destroyer. Our view is that it is a disposal that nullifies the right of the pledgee in the essence of the pledge, which the pledgee does not own, so if he permits it, he waives his right, like manumission. It differs from what occurs after the debt is due, because the pledgee is entitled to the sale. It also differs from destruction, because that is not permitted by the pledgee. If he says, "I only intended by the unqualified permission that its price should be a pledge," his claim is not heeded; for the unqualified permission necessitates a sale with the annulment of the pledge. Al-Shafi'i also held this view. If he permits it on the condition that he makes its price a pledge in its place, or that he hastens the payment of his debt from its price, it is permitted and binding. If they differ regarding the permission, the word of the pledgee is accepted, because he is the denier. If permission for the sale was granted, but they differ regarding the condition of making its price a pledge or hastening the debt from it, the word of the pledgor is accepted, because the default is the absence of a condition. It is possible that the word of the pledgee is accepted because the default is the preservation of the security. If the pledgor gives permission for the sale and then retracts it before the sale, and the pledgee sells it after having knowledge of the retraction, his sale is not valid. If he sells it