they are not obligated to level the excavation, nor pay compensation for the decrease, because they did so on the land of the insolvent person before the seller reclaimed it; therefore, they do not guarantee the decrease, just as if the insolvent person had removed it before his insolvency. As for if the insolvent person and the creditors refuse to remove it, they have the right to do so, and they are not forced to do it, because it is planting done by right. The implication of his saying, peace be upon him: "There is no right for an unjust root," is that if he is not unjust, then he has a right. If the seller offers the value of the plants and the structure so that the whole thing belongs to him, or says: "I will remove it and compensate for the resulting decrease," then if we say: "He has the right of reclamation before removal," he may do so, because the structure and plants were placed on his property for another by right, so he is entitled to take them by paying their value, or removing them and compensating for their decrease, just like a pre-emptor (shafi') when he takes land that contains plants and structures belonging to the buyer, or a lender when he reclaims his land after the borrower has planted in it. And if we say: "He does not have the right of reclamation before removal," he does not have that right, because the insolvent person's building and planting was on his own property, so he cannot be forced to sell it to this seller, nor to remove it, just as if he had not reclaimed the land. As for if the seller refuses to offer such, the right of reclamation lapses. This is the opinion of Ibn Hamid and one of the two views of the companions of al-Shafi'i. The Qadi said: It is possible that he has the right of reclamation, and this is the second opinion of al-Shafi'i, because he has found his specific property, and the property of the buyer is in it by way of subservience, so that does not prevent him from reclaiming it, like a garment if the buyer dyes it. Our view is that he did not find his property in a state that enables him to take it separated from other than it, so he may not take it, like a stone in a structure or nails in a door; and because that entails harm to the buyer and the creditors, and harm is not removed by harm; and because the dispute and litigation are not ended by reclamation here, unlike when he finds it unoccupied by anything. As for the garment if he dyes it, we do not concede that he has the right of reclamation, so it is like our issue; and if we did concede, the difference between them is from two aspects: one of them is that the dye disperses into the fabric, so it becomes like an attribute of it, unlike the structure and plants, for they are distinct entities and a basis in themselves. The second is that the garment is not intended for permanence,
(20) Recorded by al-Bukhari, in: The Chapter of Whoever Revives Dead Land, from the Book of Cultivation. Sahih al-Bukhari 3/140. And Abu Dawud, in: The Chapter on Reviving Dead Land, from the Book of Leadership. Sunan Abi Dawud 2/158. And al-Tirmidhi, in: The Chapter of What Was Mentioned Regarding the Revival of Dead Land, from the Chapters of Judgments. Aridat al-Ahwadhi 6/146. And Imam Malik, in: The Chapter of Judgment Regarding the Development of Dead Land, from the Book of Judicial Rulings. Al-Muwatta 2/743. And Imam Ahmad, in: Al-Musnad 5/327.
لم يَلْزَمْهُم تَسْوِيَةُ الحَفْرِ، ولا أَرْشُ النَّقْصِ، لأنَّهم فَعَلُوا ذلك فى أرْضِ المُفْلِسِ قبلَ رُجُوعِ البائِعِ فيها، فلم يَضْمَنُوا النَّقْصَ، كما لو قَلَعَهُ المُفْلِسُ قبلَ فَلَسِه، فأمَّا إن امْتَنَعَ المُفْلِسُ والغُرَمَاءُ من القَلْعِ، فلهم ذلك، ولا يُجْبَرُونَ عليه، لأنَّه غَرْسٌ بِحَقٍّ. ومَفْهُومُ قوله عليه السَّلَامُ: "لَيْسَ لِعِرْقٍ ظَالِمٍ حَقٌّ" (٢٠). أنَّه إذا لم يكُنْ ظالمًا فله حَقٌّ. فإن بَذَلَ البائِعُ قِيمَةَ الغِرَاسِ والبِنَاءِ، ليكونَ له الكُلُّ. أو قال: أنا أقْلَعُ، وأضْمَنُ ما نَقَصَ. فإن قُلْنا: له الرُّجُوعُ قبلَ القَلْعِ. فله ذلك؛ لأنَّ البِنَاءَ والغِرَاسَ حَصَلَ فى مِلْكِه لغيرِه بِحَقٍّ، فكان له أخْذُه بِقِيمَتِه، أو قَلْعُه. وضَمَانُ نَقْصِه، كالشَّفِيعِ إذا أخَذَ الأَرْضَ وفيها غِرَاسٌ وبِنَاءٌ لِلْمُشْتَرِى، والمُعِيرِ إذا رَجَعَ فى أرْضِه بعدَ غَرْسِ المُسْتَعِيرِ. وإن قُلْنا: ليس له الرُّجُوعُ قبلَ القَلْعِ. لم يكُنْ له ذلك؛ لأنَّ بِنَاءَ المُفْلِسِ وغَرْسَه فى مِلْكِه، فلم يُجْبَرْ على بَيْعِه لهذا البَائِعِ، ولا على قَلْعِه، كما لو لم يَرْجِعْ فى الأَرْضِ. فأمَّا إن امْتَنَعَ البائِعُ من بَذْلِ ذلك، سَقَطَ حَقُّ الرُّجُوعِ. وهذا قولُ ابنِ حامِدٍ، وأحَدُ الوَجْهَيْنِ لأصْحَابِ الشَّافِعِىِّ. وقال القاضى: يَحْتَمِلُ أنَّ له الرُّجُوعَ. وهو القولُ الثانى لِلشَّافِعِىِّ؛ لأنَّه أدْرَكَ مَتَاعَهُ بِعَيْنِه، وفيه مَالُ المُشْتَرِى على وَجْهِ التَّبَعِ، فلم يَمْنَعْهُ ذلك الرُّجُوعَ، كالثَّوْبِ إذا صَبَغَهُ المُشْتَرِى. ولَنا، أنَّه لم يُدْرِكْ مَتَاعَهُ على وَجْهٍ يمكنُه أخْذُه مُنْفَرِدًا عن غيرِه، فلم يكُنْ له أَخْذُه، كالحَجَرِ فى البِنَاءِ، والمَسَامِيرِ فى البَابِ، ولأنَّ فى ذلك ضَرَرًا على المُشْتَرِى والغُرَمَاءِ، ولا يُزَالُ الضَّرَرُ بالضَّرَرِ، ولأنَّه لا يَحْصُلُ بالرُّجُوعِ هاهُنا انْقِطَاعُ النِّزَاعِ والخُصُومَةِ، بخِلَافِ ما إذا وَجَدَها غيرَ مَشْغُولَةٍ بشىءٍ. وأمَّا الثَّوْبُ إذا صَبَغَهُ، فلا نُسَلِّمُ أن له الرُّجُوعَ، فهو كمَسْأَلَتِنَا، وإن سَلَّمْنَا فالفَرْقُ بينهما من وَجْهَيْنِ؛ أحَدُهما، أنَّ الصِّبْغَ تَفَرَّقَ فى الثَّوْبِ، فصَارَ كالصِّفَةِ فيه، بخِلَافِ البِنَاءِ والغَرْسِ، فإنَّه أعْيَانٌ مُتَمَيِّزَةٌ، وأصْلٌ فى نَفْسِه. والثانى، أنَّ الثَّوْبَ لا يُرَادُ لِلْبَقَاءِ،
(٢٠) أخرجه البخارى، فى: باب من أحيا أرضا مواتا، من كتاب الحرث. صحيح البخارى ٣/ ١٤٠. وأبو داود، فى: باب فى إحياء الموات، من كتاب الإمارة. سنن أبى داود ٢/ ١٥٨. والترمذى، فى: باب ما ذكر فى إحياء أرض الموات، من أبواب الأحكام. عارضة الأحوذى ٦/ ١٤٦. والإمام مالك، فى: باب القضاء فى عمارة الموت، من كتاب الأقضية. الموطأ ٢/ ٧٤٣. والإمام أحمد، فى: المسند ٥/ ٣٢٧.