it does not prevent reclamation, like a debt in his liability. It differs from a pledge, as the latter prevents the buyer from disposing of it. If we say he may not reclaim, its ruling is the ruling of a pledge. If we say he may reclaim, then he is given a choice: if he wishes, he may reclaim it diminished by the penalty for the crime, or if he wishes, he may demand his price along with the creditors. If the claimant releases the debtor from the crime, the seller may reclaim it, because he has found his commodity in its original state, free from the attachment of anyone else's right to it.
Section: If the buyer becomes insolvent after the sold item has left his possession—whether by sale, gift, endowment, emancipation, or otherwise—the seller does not have the right of reclamation, because he has not found his commodity in its original state with the insolvent person, regardless of whether it is possible for the buyer to recover it via an option, a defect in its price, the recovery of a gift made to his child, or otherwise, for the reason we mentioned. The departure of part of it is like the departure of the whole, as previously stated. If he becomes insolvent after that item has returned to his ownership, there are three views: The first is that he has the right of reclamation, due to the report, and because he has found the actual item of his property free from the right of another, making it similar to the case where he had not sold it at all. The second is that he does not reclaim it, because this ownership was not transferred to him from the seller, so he has no right to annul it. Our companions mentioned these two views, and the companions of al-Shafi'i have similar ones. The third is that if it returns to him through a new cause, such as sale, gift, inheritance, bequest, or the like, the seller does not have the right of reclamation because it did not come to him from the seller's side. If it returns to him through annulment, such as recession (iqala), rejection due to a defect or an option, or the like, the seller has the right of reclamation because this ownership traces back to the first cause; the annulment of the second contract does not necessitate the establishment of ownership, but rather merely removes the cause that had eliminated the seller's ownership, thus ownership is established by the first cause, and he therefore has the right to recover what ownership was established in by its sale.
Section: If the sold item is a share of property (shiqs) subject to the right of pre-emption (shuf'a), there are three views: The first is that the seller is more entitled to it. This is the opinion of Ibn Hamid, based on the report, and because when he reclaims it, the share returns to him, so the harm to the pre-emptor (shafi') is removed, as it returns to how it was before the sale, and no partnership of another party has been newly introduced.
(28) Omitted from: M.
الرُّجُوعَ، كالدَّيْنِ فى ذِمَّتِه. وفَارَقَ الرَّهْنَ؛ فإنَّه يَمْنَعُ تَصَرُّفَ المُشْتَرِى فيه. فإن قُلْنا: لا يَرْجِعُ. فَحُكْمُه حُكْمُ الرَّهْنِ. وإن قُلْنا: له الرُّجُوعُ. فهو مُخَيَّرٌ؛ إن شاءَ رَجَعَ فيه نَاقِصًا بأرْشِ الجِنَايَةِ، وإن شاءَ ضَرَبَ بِثَمَنِه مع الغُرَمَاءِ. وإن أَبْرَأَ الغَرِيمَ من الجِنَايَةِ، فَلِلْبَائِعِ الرُّجُوعُ فيه؛ لأنَّه وَجَدَ مَتَاعَهُ بِعَيْنِه خَالِيًا من تَعَلُّقِ حَقِّ غيرِه به.
فصل: وإن أفْلَسَ بعدَ خُرُوجِ المَبِيعِ من مِلْكِه؛ بِبَيْعٍ، أو هِبَةٍ، أو وقْفٍ، أو عِتْقٍ، أو غيرِ ذلك، لم يكُنْ لِلْبَائِعِ الرُّجُوعُ؛ لأنَّه لم يُدْرِكْ مَتَاعَهُ بِعَيْنِه عندَ المُفْلِسِ، سواءٌ كان المُشْتَرِى يُمْكِنُه اسْتِرْجَاعُه بخِيَارٍ له، أو عَيْبٍ فى ثَمَنِه، أو رُجُوعِه فى هِبَةِ وَلَدِه، أو غيرِ ذلك؛ لما ذَكَرْنَا. وخُرُوجُ بَعْضِه كَخُرُوجِ جَمِيعِه؛ لما تَقَدَّمَ. فإن أفْلَسَ بعدَ رُجُوعِ ذلك إلى مِلْكِه، ففيه ثلاثةُ أوْجُهٍ: أحَدُها، له الرُّجُوعُ؛ لِلْخَبَرِ، ولأنَّه وَجَدَ عَيْنَ مَالِه خَالِيًا عن حَقِّ غيرِه، أشْبَهَ ما لو لم يَبِعْهُ. والثانى، لا يَرْجِعُ؛ لأنَّ هذا المِلْكَ لم يَنْتَقِلْ إليه منه، فلم يَمْلِكْ فَسْخَهُ. ذَكَرَ أصْحَابُنا هذَيْنِ الوَجْهَيْنِ. ولِأصْحابِ الشَّافِعِىِّ مثلُ ذلك. والثالث، أنَّه (٢٨) إن عَادَ إليه بِسَبَبٍ جَدِيدٍ، كبَيْعٍ، أو هِبَةٍ، أو إرْثٍ، أو وَصِيَّةٍ، أو نحوِ ذلك. لم يكُنْ لِلْبَائِعِ الرُّجُوعُ؛ لأنَّه لم يَصِرْ إليه من جِهَتِه. وإن عَادَ إليه بِفَسْخٍ، كالإِقَالَةِ، والرَّدِّ بِعَيْبٍ أو خِيَارٍ، ونحوِ ذلك، فلِلْبَائِعِ الرُّجُوعُ؛ لأنَّ هذا المِلْكَ اسْتَنَدَ إلى السَّبَبِ الأوَّلِ، فإنَّ فَسْخَ العَقْدِ الثانى لا يَقْتَضِى ثُبُوتَ المِلْكِ، وإنَّما أزَالَ السَّبَبَ المُزِيلَ لمِلْكِ البائِعِ، فثَبَتَ المِلْكُ بِالسَّبَبِ الأَوَّلِ، فمَلَكَ اسْتِرْجَاعَ ما ثَبَتَ المِلْكُ فيه بِبَيْعِه.
فصل: وإن كان المَبِيعُ شِقْصًا مَشْفُوعًا، ففيه ثلاثةُ أوْجُهٍ: أحَدُها: البائِعُ أحقُّ به. هذا قولُ ابنِ حامِدٍ؛ لِلْخَبَرِ، ولأنَّه إذا رَجَعَ فيه عَادَ الشِّقْصُ إليه، فزَالَ الضَّرَرُ
(٢٨) سقط من: م.