and the obligation of his rights upon her. If he sells something with a condition of option (khiyar), then becomes insolvent, the option remains in its state, and he is not compelled to do what is to his advantage in terms of rescission or ratification, because insolvency prevents him from initiating a contract, but not from ratifying or executing his existing contracts. If a crime is committed against the insolvent person that necessitates a financial penalty, the money is established, and the rights of the creditors attach to it, and he may not grant a pardon for it. If it is one necessitating retribution (qisas), he is given the choice between retribution and a pardon, and he is not compelled to pardon for money, because that would forfeit the retribution which is obligatory for his interest. If he chooses retribution, nothing becomes due to the creditors. If he pardons for money, it is established, and the creditors' rights attach to it. If he pardons unconditionally, the ruling depends on the two narrated opinions regarding that which necessitates intentional [harm]; if we say it is specifically retribution, nothing is established, and the retribution is dropped. If we say it is one of two things, the blood money (diya) is established for him, and the creditors' rights attach to it. If he pardons for something other than money, the same two narrated opinions apply; if we say it is retribution in essence, nothing is established. If we say it is one of two things, the blood money is established, and it is not valid for him to drop it, because his pardon of the retribution establishes the blood money for him, and it is not valid to drop it. If he makes a gift with a condition of return, then becomes insolvent, and the return is offered to him, it becomes binding upon him to accept it, and he has no right to drop it, because he took it by way of compensation for the gifted item, so it is binding upon him to accept it, like the price in a sale. He does not have the right to drop any part of the price of sold goods, or wages in a lease, nor to accept it in an inferior quality, nor to accept the deferred delivery (muslam fihi) lacking its specified attributes, except with the permission of his creditors. The school of al-Shafi'i in this entire section is like our school.
Section: If the insolvent person's wealth is distributed, is the interdiction (hajr) lifted from him by that, or does it require a [formal] lifting of the interdiction? There are two views: One is that it ceases with the distribution of his wealth, because he was placed under interdiction for its sake, so when his ownership of it ceases, the cause of the interdiction ceases, and thus the interdiction ceases, like the cessation of the interdiction on a madman upon the cessation of his madness. The second is that it does not cease except by the ruling of a judge, because it was established by his ruling, so it does not cease except by his ruling, like one under interdiction for prodigality (safah). It differs from madness, for that is established by itself, so it ceases by its cessation. Also, because the exhaustion of his wealth requires knowledge and investigation, so stopping that at the judge is appropriate, unlike the case of the madman.
(15) In [Manuscript] M: "madness".
ووُجُوبِ حُقُوقِه عليها. ولو بَاعَ بِشَرْطِ الخِيَارِ، ثم أفْلَسَ، فالخِيَارُ بحَالِه، ولا يُجْبَرُ على ما فيه الحَظُّ من الرَّدِّ والإمْضَاءِ؛ لأنَّ الفَلَسَ يَمْنَعُه من إحْدَاثِ عَقْدٍ، أمَّا مِن إمْضَائِه وتَنْفِيذِ عُقُودِه فلا. وإن جُنِىَ على المُفْلِسِ جِنَايَةٌ تُوجِبُ المالَ، ثَبَتَ المالُ، وتَعَلَّقَتْ حُقُوقُ الغُرَمَاءِ به، ولا يَصِحُّ منه العَفْوُ عنه. وإن كانت مُوجِبَةً لِلْقِصَاصِ، فهو مُخَيَّرٌ بين القِصَاصِ والعَفْوِ، ولا يُجْبَرُ على العَفْوِ على مَالٍ؛ لأنَّ ذلك يُفَوِّتُ القِصَاصَ الذي يَجِبُ لِمَصْلَحَتِه، فإن اقْتَصَّ، لم يَجِبْ لِلْغُرَمَاءِ شيءٌ. وإن عَفَا على مَالٍ، ثَبَتَ، وتَعَلَّقَتْ حُقُوقُ الغُرَمَاءِ به. وإن عَفَا مُطْلَقًا، انْبَنَى على الرِّوَايَتَيْنِ، في مُوجِبِ العَمْدِ، إن قُلْنا: القِصَاصُ خَاصَّةً. لم يَثْبُتْ شيءٌ، وسَقَطَ القِصَاصُ. وإن قُلْنا: أحَدُ أمْرَيْنِ. ثَبَتَتْ له الدِّيَةُ، وتَعَلَّقَتْ بها حُقُوقُ الغُرَمَاءِ. وإن عَفَا على غير مَالٍ، فعلى الرِّوَايَتَيْنِ أيضا. فإن قُلْنا: القِصَاصُ عَيْنًا. لم يَثْبُتْ شيْءٌ. وإن قُلْنا: أحَدُ الأمْرَيْنِ. تَثْبُتُ الدِّيَةُ، ولم يَصِحَّ إسْقَاطُه، لأنَّ عَفْوَهُ عن القِصَاصِ يُثْبِتُ له الدِّيَةَ، ولا يَصِحُّ إسْقَاطُهَا. وإن وَهَبَ هِبَةً بشَرْطِ الثَّوَابِ، ثم أفْلَسَ، فَبُذِلَ له الثَّوَابُ، لَزِمَهُ قَبُولُه، ولم يكُنْ له إسْقَاطُه؛ لأَنَّه أخَذَهُ على سَبِيلِ العِوَضِ عن المَوْهُوبِ، فلَزِمهُ قَبُولُه، كالثَّمَنِ في البَيْعِ. وليس له إسْقَاطُ شىءٍ من ثَمَنِ مَبِيعٍ، أو أُجْرَةٍ في إجَارَةٍ، ولا قَبْضُه رَدِيئًا، ولا قَبْضُ المُسْلَمِ فيه دُونَ صِفَاتِه، إلَّا بإذْنِ غُرَمَائِه. ومذهبُ الشَّافِعي في هذا الفَصْلِ كله كمذهبِنا.
فصل: إذا فُرِّقَ مَالُ المُفْلِسِ، فهل يَنْفَكُّ عنه الحَجْرُ بذلك، أو يَحْتَاجُ إلى فَكِّ الحَجْرِ عنه؟ فيه وَجْهَانِ؛ أحَدُهما، يَزُولُ بِقِسْمَةِ مَالِه؛ لأنَّه حُجِرَ عليه لأجْلِه، فإذا زَالَ مِلْكُه عنه، زَالَ سَبَبُ الحَجْرِ، فزَالَ الحَجْرُ، كزَوَالِ حَجْرِ المَجْنُونِ، لِزَوَالِ جُنُونِه. والثاني، لا يَزُولُ إلَّا بِحُكْمِ الحاكِمِ؛ لأنَّه ثَبَتَ بحُكْمِه، فلا يَزُولُ إلَّا بحُكْمِه، كالمَحْجُورِ عليه لِسَفَهٍ. وفَارَقَ الجُنُونَ، فإنَّه يَثْبُتُ بِنَفْسِه، فزَالَ بِزَوَالِه. ولأنَّ فَرَاغَ مَالِه يَحْتَاجُ إلى مَعْرِفَةٍ وبَحْثٍ، فَوَقْفُ ذلك على الحاكِمِ، بِخِلَافِ المَجْنُونِ (١٥).
(١٥) في م: "الجنون".