and it does not follow the same rule, so he is not prevented from it, like the confession of a hadd punishment or qisas. The evidence that it does not function like wealth is that it is valid from a slave without the permission of his master, despite his prohibition from disposing of wealth, and it is not inherited, and because he is a legally responsible person (mukallaf) who divorced his wife by his own choice, so his divorce takes effect, like that of a slave or a mukatab.

Section: If he confesses to something that necessitates qisas, and the one to whom the confession was made grants a pardon in exchange for wealth, it is possible that the wealth becomes due; because this is a pardon for an established qisas, so it is valid, just as if it were established by evidence. It is also possible that it is not valid, lest this be taken as a pretext to confess to wealth, whereby the person under interdiction and the one to whom the confession was made collude on confessing to qisas and pardoning it in exchange for wealth. Furthermore, it is the obligation of wealth based on his confession, so it is not established, like confessing to it initially. According to this opinion, the obligation of qisas lapses, and the wealth does not become due immediately.

Section: If he performs khul' (divorce initiated by the wife), his khul' is valid; because if divorce is valid—from which nothing is obtained—then khul'—from which wealth is obtained—is more appropriate. However, the compensation is not paid to him; and if it is paid to him, his taking of it is not valid. If he destroys it, he is not liable, and the woman is not absolved by paying it to him, and it remains at her risk if he destroys it or if it is destroyed in his possession; because she empowered him to destroy it.

Section: If he manumits, his manumission is not valid, and this is the position of al-Qasim ibn Muhammad and al-Shafi'i. Abu al-Khattab narrated from Ahmad another opinion: that it is valid; because it is a manumission by a legally responsible person who possesses full ownership, so it is valid, like the manumission by a pledger or an insolvent person. Our argument is that it is a disposition of his wealth, so it is not valid, like his other dispositions, and because it is an act of charity, so it resembles his gift and his endowment, and because he is under interdiction to preserve his wealth for him, so his manumission is not valid, like that of a child or an insane person. He differs from the insolvent person and the pledger; for the interdiction upon them is for the right of others.