judgment in any way. This is the view of al-Shafi'i, because he is under interdiction due to his lack of maturity (rushd), and thus the ruling of his acknowledgment does not become binding upon him after the interdiction is lifted from him, just like a minor and an insane person. Furthermore, the prohibition of his acknowledgment taking effect at the time was established solely for the protection of his wealth and to repel harm from him; if it were to take effect after the lifting of the interdiction, it would serve no purpose other than to delay the harm upon him until he is in the best of his states. This differs from one who is under interdiction for the right of another, as the preventative factor there is the attachment of another’s right to his wealth, so the impediment ceases with the cessation of the right over his wealth, and thus the implication of his acknowledgment is established. In our case, the ruling was negated due to a deficiency in the acknowledgment itself, so it was not established as a valid cause. With the removal of the interdiction, the cause is not rendered complete, and thus the ruling is not established due to the discrepancy in the cause, just as it was not established before the lifting of the interdiction. Moreover, the interdiction for the right of another does not prevent them from disposing of their liabilities, so it was possible to validate their acknowledgment concerning their liabilities in a manner that does not harm others, by having it become binding upon them after the removal of the other's right. Conversely, the interdiction here is for his own benefit, due to his weak intellect and poor judgment; harm cannot be repelled except by invalidating his acknowledgment entirely, as with the minor and the insane person.

As for its validity between him and Allah the Almighty, if he knows the validity of what he acknowledged—such as a debt that became binding upon him due to a crime, or a debt that became binding upon him before he was under interdiction—he is obligated to pay it, because he knows that a right is upon him, and thus he is obligated to perform it, just as if he had not acknowledged it. However, if he knows the invalidity of his acknowledgment—such as if he knows he acknowledged a debt while he has no debt, or a crime that did not occur from him, or he acknowledged what is not binding upon him (e.g., if he destroyed the wealth of someone who gave it to him via a loan or sale)—he is not obligated to pay it, because he knows he has no debt, so nothing becomes binding upon him, just as if he had not acknowledged it.

Section: If the guardian (wali) of the spendthrift permits him to sell and buy, is it valid for him to do so? There are two views: One is that it is valid, because it is a contract of exchange, so he becomes empowered to do it by the permission, like marriage. Also, he is a rational person under interdiction, so his disposition is valid with permission, like a minor. This is verified by the fact that the interdiction upon a minor is stricter than the interdiction upon him, yet the minor's disposition is valid with permission, so it is even more so here. Furthermore, if we were to prevent his disposition with permission, we would have no way of knowing his maturity and testing him. The second view is that it is not valid, because the interdiction upon him is due to his profligacy and poor judgment; so if he grants him permission, he has permitted that which has no benefit, and it is not valid, just as if he permitted the sale of what is worth ten for five. Al-Shafi'i has two views like these. And Allah knows best.