like a vow (nadhr). The same applies to every ambiguity that does not prevent the realization of the purpose of the suretyship. Muhanna reported from Ahmad regarding a man who stood surety for a man, saying: 'If I bring him by such-and-such a time, otherwise I am liable for what is upon him.' He said: 'I do not know, but if he says: 'at such-and-such an hour', it is binding upon him.' Thus, he explicitly stated the determination of the hour and refrained from the determination of the time. Perhaps he meant an expansive time or the time of something that occurs, such as the harvest time and its like. As for if he says: 'at the time of sunrise' and similar, it is valid. If he says: 'by tomorrow' or 'by such-and-such a month,' it attaches to the beginning of it, as we mentioned in the forward sale (salam).

Section: If he stands surety for a man until a term, saying: 'If I bring him within it, otherwise I am liable for what is upon him,' it is valid. Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf stated this. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan and Al-Shafiʿi said: 'The suretyship is not valid, and he is not liable for what is upon him; because this is suspending a guarantee upon a contingency (khatar), so it is not valid, just as if he had suspended it upon the arrival of Zayd.' Our view is that this is the requirement of the suretyship and its demand, so stipulating it is valid, just as if he had said: 'If I bring him at such-and-such a time, otherwise you may imprison me.' The basis of the disagreement here rests upon the disagreement as to whether this is a requirement of the suretyship, and we have already provided evidence for that. As for if he says: 'If I bring him at such-and-such a time, otherwise I am a surety for the person of so-and-so,' or 'I am a guarantor to you for your wealth which is upon so-and-so,' or he says: 'When Zayd comes, I am a guarantor to you for what is upon him,' or 'When the pilgrim arrives, I am a surety for so-and-so,' or he says: 'I am a surety for so-and-so for a month,' the judge (al-Qadi) said: 'The suretyship is not valid.' This is the school of Al-Shafiʿi and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, because that is a contingency, so it is not permissible to suspend the guarantee and suretyship upon it, like the coming of rain or the blowing of the wind, and because it is the establishment of a right for a specific human being, so it is not permissible to suspend it upon a condition or to time it, like a gift. The Sharif Abu Jaʿfar and Abu al-Khattab said: 'It is valid,' which is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf, because he added the guarantee to the cause of existence, so it must be valid, like the guarantee of the warranty (daman al-darak). The former is more analogically sound.