If it were possible for him to remove the animal without destruction, it would not be permissible for him to destroy it. If he destroys it in this situation, he must compensate for it. But if it is not possible for him to remove it except by destruction, he may do so, and he is not liable for anything; for he is not obligated to allow the property of another in his own property. If he reconciles with him to keep it in place for a known compensation, our companions differ. Ibn Hamid and Ibn Aqil said: This is permissible, whether the branch is green or dry; because uncertainty (jahala) in what is being reconciled upon does not prevent validity, as it does not prevent delivery—unlike the compensation, which requires knowledge because its delivery is mandatory. Furthermore, there is a compelling need for reconciliation in this matter, as it occurs frequently in adjacent properties, and cutting involves destruction and harm. The increased growth is overlooked, like the weight gained by a rented animal for riding, the children born to a tenant of a room, or the saplings for which one rents land and which then grow large and coarse. Abu al-Khattab said: Reconciliation regarding it is not valid under any circumstances, whether it is green or dry, because the green grows and changes, and the dry shrinks, and it may even disappear entirely. The Qadi said: If it is dry and resting upon the wall itself, the reconciliation for it is valid; because the increase is secured in it. Reconciliation is not valid otherwise, because the green grows at every moment, and what does not rest upon the wall is not subject to valid reconciliation because it is an appendage of the airspace. This is the school of al-Shafi'i. The view most befitting the school of Ahmad is its validity; because uncertainty in what is being reconciled upon does not prevent validity if there is no way to know it, and this is due to the necessity for it, and because it does not require delivery, and this is such a case. The airspace is like the ground in that it is owned by its possessor, so reconciliation upon what is in it is permissible, just as it is for what is on the ground.
Section: If he reconciles with him to keep it in exchange for a known part of its fruit, or for all of its fruit, it has been narrated from al-Marrudhi and Ishaq ibn Ibrahim, from Ahmad, that he was asked about it and said: "I do not know." Thus, it is possible that it is valid. Makhul said something similar, for it was narrated from him that he said: "Whichever tree casts a shadow over a group of people, they have the choice between cutting what casts the shadow or eating its fruit." It is also possible that it is not valid. This is the saying of the majority.
(25) The letter 'wa' (and) was omitted from the original, A, and M.
أمْكَنَه إخْرَاجُ البَهِيمَةِ من غير إتْلَافٍ لم يَجُزْ له إتْلَافُها. فإن أتْلَفَها فى هذه الحال غَرِمَهَا، وإن لم يُمْكِنْه إزَالَتُها إلَّا بالإِتْلَافِ، فله ذلك، ولا شىءَ عليه؛ فإنَّه لا يَلْزَمُه إقْرَارُ مالِ غيرِه فى مِلْكِه. فإن صَالَحَهُ على إقْرَارِها بِعِوَضٍ مَعْلُومٍ، فَاخْتَلَفَ أصْحَابُنا. فقال ابنُ حامِدٍ وابنُ عَقِيلٍ: يجوزُ ذلك رَطْبًا كان الغُصْنُ أو يَابِسًا؛ لأنَّ الجَهَالَةَ فى المُصالَحِ عنه لا تَمْنَعُ الصِّحَّةَ، لِكَوْنِها لا تَمْنَعُ التَّسْلِيمَ، بِخِلَافِ العِوَضِ، فإنَّه يَفْتَقِرُ إلى العِلْمِ؛ لِوُجُوبِ تَسْلِيمِه، ولأنَّ الحاجَةَ دَاعِيَةٌ إلى الصُّلْحِ عنه، لكَوْنِ ذلك يَكْثُرُ فى الأَمْلَاكِ المُتَجَاوِرَةِ، وفى القَطْعِ إِتْلَافٌ وضَرَرٌ، والزِّيَادَةُ المُتَجَدِّدَةُ يُعْفَى عنها، كالسِّمَنِ الحادِثِ فى المُسْتَأْجَرِ لِلرُّكْوبِ، والمُسْتَأْجِرِ للغُرْفةِ يَتَجَدَّدُ له الأَوْلَادُ، والغِرَاسِ الذى يَسْتَأْجِرُ له الأَرْضَ يَعْظُمُ ويَجْفُو. وقال (٢٥) أبو الخَطَّابِ: لا تَصِحُّ المُصَالَحَةُ عنه بحالٍ، رَطْبًا كان أو يَابِسًا؛ لأنَّ الرَّطْبَ يَزِيدُ ويَتَغَيَّرُ، واليَابِسُ يَنْقُصُ، وَرُبَّما ذَهَبَ كلُّه. وقال القاضى: إن كان يَابِسًا مُعْتَمِدًا على نَفْسِ الجِدَارِ، صَحَّتِ المُصَالَحَةُ عنه؛ لأنَّ الزِّيَادَةَ مَأْمُونَةٌ فيه، ولا يَصِحُّ الصُّلْحُ على غيرِ ذلك؛ لأنَّ الرَّطْبَ يَزِيدُ فى كل وَقْتٍ، وما لا يَعْتَمِدُ على الجِدَارِ، لا يَصِحُّ الصُّلْحُ عليه؛ لأنَّه تَبَعُ الهَوَاءِ. وهذا مذهبُ الشَّافِعِىِّ. واللَّائِقُ بمَذْهَبِ أحْمَدَ صِحَّتُه؛ لأنَّ الجَهَالَةَ فى المُصالَحِ عنه لا تَمْنَعُ الصِّحَّةَ إذا لم يكُنْ إلى العِلْمِ به سَبِيلٌ، وذلك لِدُعَاءِ الحَاجَةِ اليه، وكَوْنِه لا يَحْتَاجُ إلى تَسْلِيمٍ، وهذا كذلك. والهَوَاءُ كالقَرَارِ فى كونِه مَمْلُوكًا لِصَاحِبِه، فَجازَ الصُّلْحُ على ما فيه، كالذى فى القَرَارِ.
فصل: وإن صَالَحَهُ على إقْرَارِهَا بِجُزْءٍ مَعْلُومٍ من ثَمَرِهَا، أو بِثَمَرِهَا كلِّه، فقد نَقَلَ المَرُّوذِىُّ وإسحاقُ بن إبراهيمَ، عن أحمدَ، أنَّه سُئِلَ عن ذلك، فقال: لا أَدْرِى. فيَحْتَمِلُ أن يَصِحّ. ونحوَه قال مَكْحُولٌ، فإنَّه نُقِلَ عنه أنَّه قال: أيُّما شَجَرَةٍ ظَلَّلَتْ على قَوْمٍ، فهم بالخِيَارِ بين قَطْعِ ما ظَلَّلَ، أو أَكْلِ ثَمَرِهَا. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن لا يَصِحَّ. وهو قَوْلُ
(٢٥) سقطت الواو من الأصل، أ، م.