The majority holds this view, and al-Shafi'i also adopted it; because the compensation is unknown, for the fruit is unknown, and its portion is unknown. Among the conditions of reconciliation is knowledge of the compensation. Furthermore, the object of reconciliation is also unknown, as it grows and changes, as we have previously stated. The argument for the first view is that this is a matter that frequently occurs in properties, and the need for it is compelling, and in cutting [it] there is destruction, so it is permissible despite the uncertainty—just as reconciliation over the flow of rainwater, reconciliation over forgotten inheritances, and [reconciliation over] unknown rights for which there is no way to attain knowledge. It appears stronger to me that reconciliation here is valid in the sense that each of them permits the other what they have offered them. Thus, the owner of the airspace permits the owner of the tree to keep it and refrains from cutting or removing it, and the owner of the tree permits him what he has offered him of its fruit. This is not in the sense of a sale, because a sale is not valid for a non-existent or unknown object, and the fruit at the time of reconciliation is non-existent and unknown. Nor is it binding; rather, each of them may retract what they have offered and return to their original position, because it is merely a mutual permission from each of them to the other. It follows the same course as if each of them said to the other: "Reside in my house and I will reside in yours," without specifying a duration or mentioning the conditions of a lease, or his saying: "I permit you to eat from the fruit of my orchard, so permit me to eat from the fruit of your orchard." Likewise is his saying: "Let me run water through your land, and you may irrigate with it whatever you wish and drink from it," and the like. This is similar to that, or even more appropriate, for this is something for which the need is pressing. In compelling [the owner] to cut, there is great harm and the destruction of much property, and in leaving it without any benefit reaching the owner of the airspace, there is harm to him. In what we have mentioned, there is a reconciliation between both matters and consideration for both parties, and it is in accordance with the [legal] principles, so it is more appropriate.

Section: The same ruling applies to everything that extends from the roots of a person's tree into the land of their neighbor, whether it causes harm—such as its effect on structures, the collapse of wells, or the foundations of walls, or by preventing the stability of the trees or crops of the owner of the land—or whether it does not cause harm. The ruling regarding cutting them and reconciling over them is the same as the ruling regarding the branches, except that roots have no fruit. If they agree that what grows from its roots is for the owner of the land, or a known portion of it, then it is like the reconciliation over the fruit that we have mentioned. According to our view, if they have reconciled upon this and a period passes, then the owner of the tree refuses to hand over its growth to the owner of the land, then he owes the "equivalent wage" (ajr al-mithl), because he only left it in his land for this purpose. So when he did not deliver it to him, he returned to [the claim for] the equivalent wage, just as if he had offered it for compensation and did not deliver it to him. Likewise is the ruling for one whose wall leans into the airspace of another's property, or whose beams slip into another's property; the ruling regarding it is in accordance with what we have mentioned.

Section: If he reconciles with him regarding a deferred debt by [paying] a part of it immediately, it is not permissible. Zayd ibn Thabit, Ibn Umar—who said: "Umar forbade selling a physical commodity (ayn) for a debt (dayn)"—Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, al-Qasim, Salim, al-Hasan, al-Sha'bi, Malik, al-Shafi'i, al-Thawri, Ibn Uyaynah, Hushaym, Abu Hanifah, and Ishaq all disliked it. It has been narrated from Ibn Abbas, al-Nakha'i, and Ibn Sirin that there is no harm in it. From al-Hasan and Ibn Sirin, it is reported that they saw no harm in [taking] trade goods in exchange for one's right before its due date; because they were trading trade goods for what is held in liability (dhimma), so it is valid, as if he purchased it for its equivalent price. Perhaps Ibn Sirin argues that early payment is permissible and [partial] waiver is in itself permissible, so combining them is permissible, as if they had done so without prior collusion regarding it. Our argument is that he is offering the amount he is waiving as compensation for the acceleration of what is in his liability, and selling [to accelerate] maturity or [to defer it] is not permissible, just as it is not permissible for him to give him ten [dirhams] immediately in exchange for twenty deferred. And because he is selling him ten for twenty, it is not permissible, as if it were defective. It differs from the case where it happens without collusion or a contract, because each of them is a volunteer, offering his right without...