Section: As for the guardian in a marriage contract, he has the right to appoint an agent to marry off his female ward without her permission, whether he is the father or someone else. The Qadi said regarding one whose guardianship is not a guardianship of compulsion: He is like the agent, and the matter is extrapolated based on the two narrations stated regarding the agent. The followers of al-Shafi'i have two views on this: One of them is that he does not have the right to appoint an agent except with her permission, because he does not have the right to perform the marriage except with her permission, so he resembles the agent. Our position is that his guardianship is from a source other than her, so her permission is not considered regarding his appointing an agent, just like the father, unlike the agent; and because he acts by virtue of religious guardianship, he resembles the judge; and because the judge has the right to delegate the drawing up of marriage contracts to someone else without the women's permission, so too is the guardian. The argument they mentioned is invalidated by the judge. The one whose permission is considered in this matter is different from the one for whom an agent is appointed, as evidenced by the fact that the agent also does not dispense with her permission to perform the marriage, so he is like the one who is appointed for that.

Section: If the principal grants permission to appoint an agent, and he does so, the second agent is an agent for the principal. He is not dismissed by the death of the first agent, nor by his dismissal, and the first agent does not have the right to dismiss the second, because he is not his agent. If he granted him permission to appoint an agent for himself, it is permissible, and he is an agent for the principal, and he is dismissed by his (the principal's) death or by his dismissing him. If the principal dies or the first agent is dismissed, both are dismissed, because they are both branches of him, but one of them is a branch of the other, so their authority ceases with the cessation of their origin. If he appoints someone without being granted permission to appoint an agent verbally, but rather it is found by custom, or based on the narration in which we permitted him to appoint an agent without permission, then the second is an agent of the first agent, and his ruling is the same as the ruling if he had granted him permission to appoint an agent for himself.