the lost amount from his own dirhams. As for the other interpretation, which is when he mixes them with that from which they can be distinguished, then if the principal's dirhams alone are lost, there is no liability upon him; because they were lost without any transgression on his part.
843- Issue: He said: "And if he ordered him to pay money to a man, and he claimed that he had paid it to him, his statement is not accepted against the orderer except with evidence."
Its summary is that if a man appoints an agent to pay his debt, and gives him money to pay it to him, and the agent claims payment of the debt and payment of the money to the creditor, his statement is not accepted against the creditor except with evidence; because he is not his trusted person (amin), so his statement against him regarding the payment is not accepted, just as if the principal had claimed that. If the creditor takes an oath, he has the right to demand payment from the principal; because his liability is not absolved by paying the money to his agent. If he pays it, does the principal have the right to recourse against his agent? It is looked into: if he claims that he paid the debt without evidence, the principal has [the right of recourse against him if he paid it in the principal's absence]. Al-Qadi said: This applies whether he confirms him that he paid the right or denies it. This is the view of al-Shafi'i; because he permitted him to make a payment that would absolve him, and it was not found. From Ahmad, there is another narration: He does not recover anything from him, unless he had ordered him to call for witnesses and he did not do so. According to this narration, if the principal confirms him regarding the payment, he does not recover anything from him, and if he denies him, the statement is the agent's statement along with his oath. This is the view of Abu Hanifa, and a view held by the followers of al-Shafi'i; because he claimed the performance of what his principal ordered him to do, so the statement is his statement, just as if he ordered him to sell his garment, and he claimed that he sold it. The view of the first [group] is that he was negligent by omitting to call for witnesses, so he is liable, as if he were negligent in selling for less than the market price. If it is said: Why did he not order him to call for witnesses? We say: The absolute command to pay implies that; because it is not established except through it, so it becomes like his command to sell and buy, as is implied by custom, not by generality. It is thus here. And the analogy of the other view makes it possible to adopt its requirements, which is that his statement is accepted regarding the payment, but...
(1) In M, an addition: "the other". (2) In the original and B: "So if". (3) Omitted from: M. (4) In B and M: "the agent".
الضائِعَ من دَرَاهِم نَفْسِه. فأمَّا على المَحْمَلِ الآخَرِ، وهو إذا خَلَطَها بما تَتَمَيَّزُ منه، فإذا ضَاعَتْ دَرَاهِمُ المُوَكِّلِ وَحْدَها فلا ضَمَانَ عليه؛ لأنَّها ضاعَتْ من غيرِ تَعَدٍّ منه.
٨٤٣ - مسألة؛ قال: (وَلَوْ أمَرَهُ أنْ يَدْفَعَ إلَى رَجُلٍ مَالًا، فَادَّعَى أنَّهُ دَفَعَهُ إلَيْهِ، لَمْ يُقْبَلْ قَوْلُه عَلَى الْآمِرِ (١) إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ)
وجُمْلته أنَّ الرَّجُلَ إذا وَكَّلَ وَكِيلًا في قَضَاءِ دَيْنِه، ودَفَعَ إليه مَالًا لِيَدْفَعَهُ إليه، فادَّعَى الوَكِيلُ قَضاءَ الدَّيْنِ ودَفْعَ المالِ إلى الغَرِيمِ، لم يُقْبَلْ قولُه على الغَرِيمِ إلَّا بِبَيِّنَةٍ؛ لأنَّه ليس بأَمِينِه، فلم يُقْبَلْ قولُه عليه في الدَّفْعِ إليه، كما لو ادَّعَى المُوَكِّلُ ذلك. فإذا حَلَفَ الغَرِيمُ، فله مُطَالَبَةُ المُوَكِّلِ؛ لأنَّ ذِمَّتَهُ لا تَبْرَأُ بِدَفْعِ المالِ إلى وَكِيلِه. فإذا دَفَعَهُ فهل لِلْمُوَكِّلِ الرُّجُوعُ على وَكِيلِه؟ يُنْظَرُ، فإن ادَّعَى أنَّه قَضَى الدَّيْنَ بغيرِ بَيِّنَةٍ، فلِلْمُوَكِّلِ [الرُّجُوعُ عليه إذا (٢) قضَاهُ في غَيْبةِ المُوَكِّلِ] (٣). قال القاضِى: سواءٌ صَدَّقَه أنَّه قَضَى الحَقَّ أو كَذَّبَهُ. وهذا قولُ الشّافِعِىِّ؛ لأنَّه أذِنَ له في قَضَاءٍ يُبْرِئُه، ولم يُوجَدْ. وعن أحمدَ، رِوَايَةٌ أُخْرَى: لا يَرْجِعُ عليه بِشىءٍ، إلَّا أن يكونَ أمَرَهُ بالإِشْهَادِ فلم يَفْعَلْ. فعلى هذه الرِّوَايةِ، إن صَدَّقهُ المُوَكِّلُ (٤) في الدَّفْعِ، لم يَرْجِعْ عليه بشيءٍ، وإن كَذَّبَهُ، فالقولُ قولُ الوَكِيلِ مع يَمِينِه. وهذا قولُ أبى حنيفةَ، وَوَجهٌ لأَصْحابِ الشّافِعِىِّ؛ لأنَّه ادَّعَى فِعْلَ ما أمَرَ به مُوَكِّلُه، فكان القولُ قولَه، كما لو أمَرَهُ بِبَيْعِ ثَوْبِه، فَادَّعَى أنه بَاعَهُ. وَوَجْهُ الأَوَّلِ أنَّه مُفَرِّطٌ بِتَرْكِ الإِشْهَادِ، فضَمِنَ، كما لو فَرَّطَ في البَيْعِ بدون ثمَنِ المِثْلِ. فإن قِيلَ: فلم يَأْمُرُهُ بالإِشْهَادِ؟ قُلْنا: إطْلَاقُ الأَمْرِ بالقَضَاءِ يَقْتَضِى ذلك؛ لأنَّه لا يَثْبُتُ إلَّا به، فيَصِيرُ كأَمْرِه بالبَيْعِ والشِّرَاءِ، يَقْتَضِى ذلك العُرْفُ لا العُمُومُ. كذا ههُنا. وقِيَاسُ القَوْلِ الآخَر يُمْكِنُ القولُ بمُوجِبِه. وأنَّ قَوْلَهُ مَقْبُولٌ في القَضَاءِ، لكنْ
(١) في م زيادة: "الآخر".(٢) في الأصل، ب: "فإذا".(٣) سقط من: م.(٤) في ب، م: "الوكيل".