purchase it from his master, just as a stranger could. If it is permissible for him to purchase another, it is permissible for him to purchase himself, just as when it became permissible for a woman to be appointed as an agent to divorce another, it became permissible for her to do so for herself. The view mentioned by our colleagues is incorrect, because the furthest that can be posited here is that the appointment of a slave is like the appointment of his master, and we have already mentioned the validity of a master's appointment for purchasing and selling on his own behalf; thus, it is more appropriate here. Accordingly, if the slave says: "I have purchased myself for Zayd," and both his master and Zayd confirm him, it is valid, and the price becomes binding upon Zayd. But if the master says: "You have only purchased yourself for your own sake," the slave is emancipated by his statement and his acknowledgment against himself that he is emancipated by, and the price becomes binding upon the slave as a liability to his master, because Zayd is not liable for the price, as the slave was not obtained by him, and since the master does not claim it from him, it falls upon the slave, because the apparent state of one who initiates a contract is that it is for his own sake. If the master confirms him but Zayd denies him, you must examine his denial; if he denies the agency, he must take an oath and is then cleared, and the master has the right to rescind the sale and reclaim his slave due to the impossibility of receiving his price. If he confirms the agency but denies him by saying, "You did not purchase yourself for me," then the statement of the slave is accepted, because the word of an agent is accepted regarding an action for which he is permitted.

Section: If he appoints his slave to emancipate himself, or his wife to divorce herself, it is valid. If he appoints a slave to emancipate his (the master's) other slaves, or a wife to divorce his other wives, the slave does not have the authority to emancipate himself, nor the wife to divorce herself, because such a mandate, when unrestricted, pertains to acting on behalf of another. It is possible that they do have that authority, derived from the generality of his wording, just as it is permissible for an agent in a sale to sell to himself, according to one of the two narrations. If he appoints a creditor of his to discharge himself from debt, it is valid, because he has appointed him to drop a right against himself, which resembles appointing a slave to emancipate himself. If he appoints him to discharge his other creditors, he does not have the right to discharge himself, just as if he appointed him to imprison his creditors, he would not have the authority to imprison himself. If he appointed him for their litigation, he would not be an agent for the litigation of himself. It is possible that he does have the authority to discharge himself, for the reasons we mentioned earlier. If he appoints the one on whose behalf the debt is guaranteed to discharge the guarantor, and he discharges him, it is valid, and the one on whose behalf the debt is guaranteed is not discharged. If he appoints the guarantor to discharge the one on whose behalf the debt is guaranteed, or the surety to discharge the one for whom he is a surety, and he discharges him, it is valid, and the agent is also discharged by his discharge, because it is a branch dependent upon him; so if the principal is discharged, the branch is discharged by his discharge.