Section: If he appoints him to distribute charity to the poor and he is poor, or he bequeaths to him to distribute his third [of his estate] among a group and he is one of them, or he gives him wealth and orders him to distribute it to whom he wishes or to give it to whom he chooses, then the explicit statement of Ahmad is that it is not permissible for him to take anything from it. For Ahmad said: If a person has in his possession wealth for the poor and charitable causes and he is in need, he should not eat anything from it, for he was only ordered to execute its distribution. This is because the absolute nature of the principal's wording is interpreted as giving it to others. It is possible that it is permissible for him to take from it if the generality of the wording encompasses him, as in the cases mentioned previously, and because the meaning which establishes entitlement is realized in him, and the wording includes him, so it is permissible for him to take it, just as others may. It is also possible that this refers to the situational contexts, so if it is highly probable that he intended generality for himself and others, he may take from it; if it is highly probable that he did not intend it, he may not take from it; and if both matters are equal, two possibilities arise. Is it permissible for him to give it to his child, his parent, or his wife? There are two possibilities: the first is its permissibility, due to their inclusion in the generality of his wording and the existence of the meaning requiring the permissibility of giving to them. As for those other than these whose maintenance is incumbent upon him, it is permissible to give it to them, just as it is permissible to give voluntary charity to them.

845 - Issue; He said: (And a man's purchase for himself from the wealth of his infant child is permissible. Likewise, his purchase for his child from himself.)

He means that it is permissible for a father to purchase for himself from the wealth of his son who is under his guardianship, and to sell to his child from his own wealth. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi'i, Malik, and al-Awza'i. They added the grandfather, permitting him to do this as well. Zufar said: It is not permissible, because the rights of the contract attach to the contracting party, and it is not permissible for two contradictory rulings to attach to it; and because it is not permissible for one to be the offeror and the acceptor in a single contract, just as it is not permissible for him to marry his cousin from himself. To us [the Hanbalis], he has authority over the person himself, so it is permissible for him to handle both sides of the contract, just as a father marries his daughter to his young slave, and a master marries his slave to his bondmaid. We do not concede his point regarding the attachment of the rights of the contract to the contracting party for someone else. As for the grandfather, he has no guardianship over his grandson, as we shall mention in its place, so he is treated as a stranger. Furthermore, suspicion between a father and his child is nonexistent, as it is in his nature to be compassionate toward him, to incline toward him, and to leave his own share for his [the child's] share, and for this reason it is permissible. This differs from the grandfather, the executor of a will (wasi), the judge, and his trusted agent, as suspicion is not nonexistent in their case. As for handling both sides of the contract, it is permissible by the evidence of the principle we have mentioned. We do not concede what he mentioned regarding the case where he wishes to marry his cousin; rather, it is permissible by the evidence that 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Awf said to the daughter of Qariẓ: "Will you delegate your affair to me?" She said: "Yes." He said: "I have married you." [Even if we concede his point], it is because suspicion is not nonexistent there.

846 - Issue; He said: (And whatever the agent does after the principal rescinds [the agency] or dies is void.)

In summary, the agency is a revocable contract from both sides. The principal has the right to dismiss his agent whenever he wishes, and the agent has the right to dismiss himself, for it is an authorization to act, and each of them may invalidate it, just as if one authorized another to eat his food. It is also invalidated by the death of either of them, whoever it may be, or by persistent insanity. There is no disagreement on all of this as far as we know. Whenever an agent acts after the principal's rescission or death, it is void if he knows of that. If the agent does not know of the dismissal or the death of the principal, there are two narrations from Ahmad regarding it, and there are two opinions for al-Shafi'i. The apparent meaning of al-Khiraqi's words here is that he is dismissed whether he knows or not. Whenever he acts, it becomes apparent that his action was after his dismissal or the death of his principal, so his action is void, because it is the dissolution of a contract that does not require the consent of its party, and thus does not require his knowledge, such as divorce or manumission. The second narration from Ahmad is that he is not dismissed before his knowledge of the death of the principal or his dismissal. He stated this in the narration of Ja'far ibn Muhammad, because if he were dismissed before his knowledge, there would be harm in it; for he might perform actions that would turn out to be void, and perhaps he might sell a slave girl and the purchaser would have intercourse with her, or food and he would eat it, or otherwise, and the purchaser would then dispose of it, and liability would become incumbent, and the purchaser and the agent would be harmed. And because he acts...