that which is explicitly stated in terms of purpose, so his specification of one of them is permission for the other, just as if he had leased or borrowed land for the cultivation of something, it is considered permission for the cultivation of something similar to it or less than it. If he rented a property, he is permitted to let someone live in it who is similar to him. If he vowed a prayer or i'tikaf in a mosque, it is permissible to perform the i'tikaf or prayer in another. This is the same whether he stipulated the price for him or did not stipulate it. If he specified the purchaser for him, saying: "Sell it to such-and-such a person," he does not have the authority to sell it to anyone else, without any disagreement that we are aware of, whether he stipulated the price for him or did not stipulate it; because he may have a purpose in transferring ownership to him specifically and not to another, unless the agent knows through an indication or explicitly that he has no purpose regarding the specific purchaser.

Section: If he appoints him as an agent for a corrupt (invalid) contract, he does not have the authority for it; because Allah the Exalted has not permitted it, and because the principal does not possess the authority for it, so the agent is even less entitled to it. He does not have the authority for the valid (contract) either; because the principal did not grant him permission for it. This is the position of Al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: He does have the authority for the valid one; because if he granted permission for the corrupt one, the valid one is more appropriate. Our argument is that he granted him permission for something forbidden, so he does not possess the authority for the lawful by virtue of this permission, just as if he had permitted him to purchase wine or pork, he would not have the authority to purchase horses or sheep.

Section: If he appoints him to sell a slave, an animal, real estate, or similar, or to purchase them, he does not have the authority to contract on only a portion of it; because the agency encompasses the whole, and in partial execution there is harm to the principal and fragmentation of his property, and he did not grant him permission for that. If he appoints him to sell slaves or purchase them, he possesses the authority to contract for them collectively and one by one; because the permission encompasses the contract for them as a group, and the custom regarding their sale and purchase is to contract for one by one, and there is no harm in gathering them or separating them. If he says: "Purchase for me slaves in a single transaction, or one by one, or sell them," it is not permissible to oppose him; because his specific mention of that indicates his purpose regarding it, so his permission does not encompass other than it.