and his master, or the master’s two sons, or his two parents testify for him, it is not accepted, because the master testifies for his slave, his two sons testify for their father’s slave, and the parents testify for their son’s slave. If he is emancipated, and then they repeat the testimony, is it accepted? There are two possibilities.

Section: If two men appear before the judge, and one of them admits that the other appointed him as an agent, then the principal is absent, and the agent appears and presents an opponent to his principal, saying, "I am the agent of so-and-so." The opponent denies that he is his agent. If we say: The judge does not judge based on his own knowledge, his claim is not heard until evidence is established regarding his agency. If we say: He does judge based on his own knowledge, and the judge knows the principal by his person, name, and lineage, he affirms it and enables him to dispose of the matter, because his knowledge is like evidence. If he knows him by his person but not by his name and lineage, he does not accept his statement until evidence is established before him regarding the agency, because he seeks to establish his lineage before him by his own statement, so it is not accepted.

Section: If a man appears before the judge and claims that he is the agent of so-and-so, the absent person, in a specific matter, and brings evidence testifying for him regarding the agency, the judge hears it. If he claims a right for his principal before his agency is established, the judge does not hear his claim. Malik and al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifah said: He does not hear it unless he presents an opponent from among the principal’s opponents and claims a right against him; when the defendant answers, the judge then hears the evidence. Thus, a disagreement arose between us regarding two rulings: first, that in our view, the judge hears evidence regarding agency without the presence of an opponent, while in his view, he does not. Second, that his claim for his principal is not heard before his agency is established, while in his view, it is heard. Abu Hanifah based this on his principle that judgment against an absent person is not permissible, and hearing evidence of agency without an opponent is a judgment against an absent person, and that agency does not bind the opponent as long as the agent does not answer the