For him. If you clarify, [well and good]; otherwise, we shall deem you a refuser (nakil) and pass judgment against you. This is the view of the companions of al-Shafi’i, except they stated: If you do not clarify, we will make the person in whose favor the admission is made swear an oath regarding what he claims, and we will obligate it upon you. If he does so, [it is established]; otherwise, we make the person in whose favor the admission is made swear, and we obligate it upon the one who made the admission. The basis for the first view is that he is withholding a right that is due from him, so he is to be imprisoned for it, just as if he had specified it and refused to perform it. Furthermore, whenever the claimant specifies it and claims it, and the one who made the admission refuses, it follows what they have stated. If the person upon whom the right lies dies, his heirs are taken to task for the same; this is because the right was established upon their inherited estate, so it attaches to his estate which has passed to the heirs, and thus what was binding upon their predecessor becomes binding upon them, just as if the right had been specified. If the deceased left no estate, there is nothing upon the heirs.

Whenever he explains his admission with something that is considered wealth (mutamawwal) by custom, his explanation is accepted and it is established, unless the person in whose favor the admission is made denies it and claims a different category, or claims nothing at all, in which case his admission becomes void. If he explains it with something not considered wealth by custom, such as a walnut shell or an eggplant peel, his admission is not accepted; because his admission is an acknowledgment of a right due upon his liability (dhimma), and this does not fix to the liability. The same applies if he explains it with something that is not wealth in the Sharia, such as wine, swine, or carrion; it is not accepted. If he explains it with a dog that is not permitted to be kept, the same applies. If he explains it with a dog that is permitted to be kept, or the hide of a carcass that has not been tanned, there are two views: one is that it is accepted, because it is something that must be returned to him and handed over to him, so the obligation encompasses it. The second view is that it is not accepted, because an admission is an account of what must be guaranteed (daman), and this does not require a guarantee. If he explains it with a grain of wheat or barley and the like, it is not accepted because this is not usually considered wealth on its own. If he explains it with a fixed penalty for slander (qadhf), it is accepted because it is a right due upon him. It is possible that it is not accepted, because it does not result in wealth. The first is more correct, because whatever is established in the liability can correctly be said to be "upon me." If he explains it with the right of pre-emption (shuf’a), it is accepted because it is an obligatory right that leads to wealth. If he explains it with returning a greeting (salam) or responding to a sneeze (tashmit) and the like, it is not accepted because it lapses by passing; therefore, it is not established in the liability. This admission points toward the establishment of a right in the liability. It is possible that his explanation is accepted if he means that the right upon me is to return his greeting when he greets, and to respond to him when he sneezes; based on what was narrated in the tradition: "The Muslim has thirty rights over the Muslim: he returns his greeting, responds to his sneeze, and accepts his invitation." And he mentioned the Hadith (20). If he says, "I usurped (ghasabtu) something from him," and explains it with something that is not wealth, it is accepted, because the term usurpation applies to it. If he says, "I usurped his person (nafsahu)," it is not accepted, because usurpation does not apply to it. Most of this section is the school of al-Shafi’i. It was narrated from Abu Hanifa that the explanation of his admission is not accepted unless it is for something measurable by volume (makil) or by weight (mawzun); because anything else does not establish itself in the liability. Our position is that it is property (mamluk) that comes under a contract, so it is permissible for a thing in an admission to be explained by it, like the measurable and the weighted; and because it is established in the liability in general, so the explanation is valid like the measurable, and there is no consideration given to the cause of its establishment in the admission of it and the account given of it.