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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 7 · صفحة 347فصل

الترجمة · EN

For the harm of planting trees is in the depth of the earth due to the spreading of roots within it, while the harm of building is on its surface; therefore, permission for one of them is not permission for the other. If he borrows it to plant wheat, he may plant it and anything that causes less harm than it, such as barley, fava beans, and lentils. He may also plant that which causes harm equivalent to wheat, because consenting to the planting of one thing is consent to its harm and anything less than it. However, he may not plant that which causes more harm than it, such as millet, sorghum, and cotton, because their harm is greater. The ruling on the permissibility of usage in a loan (ariyah) is like the ruling on usage in a lease (ijara) regarding what he is permitted to fulfill and what he is prohibited from. We will mention the details of this in the chapter on Leasing, if Allah the Almighty wills. If he gives him permission to plant one time, he does not have the right to plant more than that. If he gives him permission to plant a tree and it is uprooted, he does not have the right to plant another. Likewise, if he gives him permission to place a piece of wood (28) on a wall and it breaks, he does not possess the right to place another, because if permission is restricted to a specific thing, it does not exceed it.

Section: If he (29) borrows something, he may fulfill its benefit personally or through his agent, because his agent is a deputy for him, and his possession is like his own possession. He does not have the right to lease it, because he does not possess the benefits, so it is not valid for him to transfer them to others. We are not aware of any disagreement regarding this. There is also no disagreement among them that the borrower does not own the physical entity itself. They are in consensus that the borrower has the right to use the borrowed item in that which he was granted permission for, but he does not have the right to lend it to someone else. This is one of the two opinions of the followers of al-Shafi'i. They said in the other: He has that right. This is the view of Abu Hanifa, because he transfers it just as he received it, so it is permissible just as it is permissible for a lessee to lease. The scholars of jurisprudence (ashab al-ra'y) said: If he borrows a garment for him to wear, and he gives it to someone else who wears it, he is liable. If he does not specify who is to wear it, there is no liability upon him. Malik said: If it is not used by anyone other than the one who would have used the item that was borrowed, there is no liability upon him. Our view is that a loan (ariyah) is a permission for the benefit, so it is not permissible for him to permit it to another, just like the permission (30) to eat food. It differs from leasing because in leasing he owns the usage in every aspect, so he owns the right to transfer it, whereas in a loan he does not own it; he only owns the right to fulfill it in the manner for which he was permitted, so it resembles one who is permitted to eat food.

الحواشي

(28) In A, B, and M: "his piece of wood". (29) In A and B: "And whoever". (30) In B: "And like the permission".

العربية (المصدر)

ضَرَرَ الغِرَاسِ في باطِنِ الأَرْضِ لِانْتِشَارِ العُرُوقِ فيها، وضَرَرَ البِنَاءِ في ظَاهِرِهَا، فلم يكُنِ الإِذْنُ في أحَدِهِما إذْنًا في الآخَرِ. وإن اسْتَعَارَها لِزَرْعِ الحِنْطَةِ، فله زَرْعُها وزَرْعُ ما هو أقَلُّ ضَرَرًا منها، كالشَّعِيرِ والبَاقِلَّا والعَدَسِ، وله زَرْعُ ما ضَرَرُه كضَرَرِ الحِنْطَةِ؛ لأنَّ الرِّضَى بِزِرَاعَةِ شيءٍ رِضىً بِضَرَرِه، وما هو دونه، وليس له زَرْعُ ما هو أكْثَرُ ضَرَرًا منه، كالذُّرَةِ والدُّخْنِ والقُطْنِ؛ لأنَّ ضَرَرَهُ أكْثَرُ. وحُكْمُ إبَاحَةِ الانْتِفَاعِ في العَارِيَّةِ، كحُكْمِ الانْتِفَاعِ في الإِجَارَةِ فيما له أن يَسْتَوْفِيَهُ، وما يُمْنَعُ منه. وسَنَذْكُرُ في الإِجَارَةِ تَفْصِيلَ ذلك، إن شاءَ اللهُ تعالى. وإن أَذِنَ له في زَرْعِ مَرَّةٍ، لم يكُنْ له أن يَزْرَعَ أكْثَرَ منها. وإنْ أَذِنَ له في غَرْسِ شَجَرَةٍ فانْقَلَعَتْ، لم يكُنْ له غَرْسُ أُخْرَى، وكذلك إن أَذِنَ له في وَضْعِ خَشَبَةٍ (٢٨) على حائِطٍ فانْكَسَرَتْ، لم يَمْلِكْ وَضْعَ أُخْرَى؛ لأنَّ الإِذْنَ إذا اخْتَصَّ بشيءٍ لم يَتَجَاوَزْهُ.

فصل: وإن (٢٩) اسْتَعارَ شَيْئًا، فله اسْتِيفَاءُ مَنْفَعَتِه بِنَفْسِه وبِوَكِيلِه؛ لأنَّ وَكِيلَه نائِبٌ عنه، ويَدُه كيَدِه. وليس له أن يُؤْجِرَهُ؛ لأنَّه لم يَمْلِك المَنَافِعَ، فلا يَصِحُّ أن يُمَلِّكَها. ولا نَعْلَمُ في هذا خِلَافًا. ولا خِلَافَ بينهم أن المُسْتَعِيرَ لا يَمْلِكُ العَيْنَ. وأَجْمَعُوا على أنَّ لِلْمُسْتَعِيرِ اسْتِعْمَالَ المُعَارِ فيما أُذِنَ له فيه، وليس له أن يُعِيرَه غيرَه. وهذا أحَدُ الوَجْهَيْنِ لأَصْحَابِ الشّافِعِىِّ. وقالُوا في الآخَرِ: له ذلك. وهو قولُ أبى حنيفةَ؛ لأنَّه يُمَلِّكُه على حَسَبِ ما مَلَكَه، فجازَ كما لِلْمُسْتَأْجِرِ أن يُؤْجِرَ. قال أصْحَابُ الرَّأْىِ: إذا اسْتَعارَ ثَوْبًا لِيَلْبَسَهُ هو، فأَعْطاهُ غيرَه، فَلَبِسَه، فهو ضَامِنٌ. وإن لم يُسَمِّ من يَلْبَسُه، فلا ضَمَانَ عليه. وقال مالِكٌ: إذا لم يَعْمَلْ بها إلَّا الذي كان يَعْمَلُ بها الذي أُعِيرَها، فلا ضَمَانَ عليه. ولَنا، أنَّ العارِيَّةَ إِبَاحَةُ المَنْفَعَةِ، فلم يَجُزْ أن يُبِيحَها غيره كإِبَاحَةِ (٣٠) الطَّعَامِ. وفارَقَ الإِجَارَةَ؛ لأنَّه مَلَكَ الانْتِفَاعَ على كل وَجْهٍ، فمَلَكَ أن

الحواشي

(٢٨) في أ، ب، م: "خشبته".(٢٩) في أ، ب: "ومن".(٣٠) في ب: "وكإباحة".

السابقمجلد 7 · صفحة 347التالي
السابق7·347التالي