to establishing a right for his heir in the preferential treatment. It differs from a gift to the heir's creditor because the heir's entitlement to take it for his debt is not derived from the gift itself, whereas here, his entitlement is derived from the sale effected by his deceased relative; thus, they are distinct. The companions of al-Shafi'i have five views on this; two are like these two. The third is that the sale is void from its inception because it leads to conveying the preferential treatment to the heir. This is incorrect, because preemption is a branch of the sale, and the foundation is not rendered void by the invalidation of a branch of it. According to the first view, what the heir obtained through preferential treatment was not actually obtained by him; rather, it was obtained by someone else and reached him through the mechanism of taking it from the buyer, so it resembles a gift to the heir's creditor. The fourth view is that the preemptor may take the portion excluding the preferential treatment at the full price, analogous to a gift of [that which corresponds to the preferential treatment; because the preferential treatment at half, for example, is a gift of half. This is invalid, because if it were equivalent to a gift of] half, the foreign preemptor would not have the right to take the whole, for that which is gifted has no preemption. The fifth is that the sale is void to the extent of the preferential treatment; this is also incorrect, because it is preferential treatment for a foreigner that is less than one-third, so it does not become void, just as if the share were not subject to preemption.

Section: The preemptor acquires the share by taking it with any expression that indicates his taking it, such as by saying, "I have taken it for the price," or "I have acquired it for the price," or similar, provided that the price and the share are known, and it does not require the judgment of a judge. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Al-Qadi and Abu al-Khattab said: He acquires it by demanding it, because the preceding sale is the cause, and when the demand is added to it, it is like the offer in a sale being joined by the acceptance. Abu Hanifa said: It is only achieved by the judge's ruling, because it is a transfer of ownership from its owner to another by compulsion, so it requires the judgment of a judge, like the collection of one's debt. We argue that it is a right established by the Text (nass) and consensus (ijma'), so it does not require a judge, like returning an item due to a defect. And what they mentioned is refuted