It is not like acknowledgment, because that is a report of a prior right. As for the discerning child (mumayyiz), his guaranty is not valid according to the correct of the two opinions. This is the view of al-Shafi'i. Our colleagues derived this from the two narrations regarding the validity of his acknowledgment and his disposals with the permission of his guardian, but this reconciliation is not sound because this is an undertaking of wealth from which he derives no benefit, so it is not valid from him, just like a donation or a vow, unlike a sale. If they disagree regarding the time of the guaranty after he reached puberty—the child says, "Before I reached puberty," and the guaranteed party says, "After puberty"—the Qadi said: The analogy of Ahmad's view is that the statement is that of the guaranteed party, because with him is the presumption of the validity of the contract, so his statement prevails, just as if they disagreed regarding a corrupt condition. It is also possible that the statement is that of the guarantor, because the original state is the absence of puberty and the absence of the obligation of the right upon him. This is the view of al-Shafi'i. This does not resemble the case where they disagree on a corrupt condition, because the disputants there agree on the capacity (ahliyya) for disposal, and the outward appearance is that they do not engage in anything but a valid disposal, so the statement of the one claiming validity is the apparent one. Here, however, they disagree on the capacity for disposal, and the one claiming capacity has no apparent evidence to rely upon, nor a principle to return to, so his claim does not carry weight. The ruling for one known to have a history of insanity is the same as the ruling for the child. If he is not known to have a history of insanity, the statement is that of the guaranteed party because the original state is its absence. As for the one under interdiction due to insolvency (falas), his guaranty is valid and he is pursued for it after the interdiction is lifted from him, because he possesses the capacity for disposal; the interdiction is upon his wealth, not his liability (dhimma). Thus he resembles a pledger; his disposal is valid in everything other than the pledge, so it is as if he had borrowed, acknowledged, or purchased upon his liability. The guaranty of a slave is not valid without the permission of his master, regardless of whether he has been granted permission for trade or not. This is the view of Ibn Abi Layla, al-Thawri, and Abu Hanifa. It is possible that it is valid and he is pursued for it after manumission. This is one of the two opinions of the colleagues of al-Shafi'i, because he possesses the capacity for disposal, so his disposal is valid in matters that cause no harm to the master, like an acknowledgment of destruction. The rationale for the first view is that it is a contract containing an obligation of wealth, so it is not valid without permission, like marriage.
(39) In the original, A, and M: "ahmiyya" (importance). (40) In M: "al-sarf" (currency exchange). (41) Omitted from A.
الإِقْرارَ؛ لأنَّه إِخْبَارٌ بِحَقٍّ سَابِقٍ. وأما الصَّبِىُّ المُمَيِّزُ، فلا يَصِحُّ ضَمَانُه، في الصَّحِيحِ من الوَجْهَيْنِ. وهو قول الشَّافِعِىِّ. وخَرَّجَهُ أصْحابُنا على الرِّوَايَتَيْنِ في صِحَّةِ إقْرَارِه وتَصَرُّفَاتِه بإِذْنِ وَلِيِّهِ، ولا يَصِحُّ هذا الجَمْعُ؛ لأنَّ هذا الْتِزَامُ مالٍ لا فائِدَةَ له فيه، فلم يَصِحَّ منه، كالتَّبَرُّعِ والنَّذْرِ، بِخِلَافِ البَيْعِ. وإن اخْتَلَفَا في وَقْتِ الضَّمَانِ بعدَ بُلُوغِه، فقال الصَّبِىُّ: قبلَ بُلُوغِى. وقال المَضْمُونُ له: بعدَ البُلُوغِ. فقال القاضي: قِياسُ قول أحمدَ أنَّ القولَ قولُ المَضْمُونِ له؛ لأنَّ معه سَلامةَ العَقْدِ، فكان القولُ قولَه، كما لو اخْتَلَفَا في شَرْطٍ فَاسِدٍ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أنَّ القولَ قولُ الضَّامِنِ؛ لأنَّ الأصْلَ عَدَمُ البُلُوغِ، وعَدَمُ وُجُوبِ الحَقِّ عليه. وهذا قولُ الشَّافِعِىِّ. ولا يُشْبِهُ هذا ما إذا اخْتَلَفَا في شَرْطٍ فَاسِدٍ؛ لأنَّ المُخْتَلِفَيْنِ ثَمَّ مُتَّفِقانِ على أهْلِيَّةِ (٣٩) التَّصَرُّفِ، والظَّاهِرُ أنَّهما لا يَتَصَرَّفانِ إلَّا تَصَرُّفًا صَحِيحًا، فكان قولُ مُدَّعِى الصِّحَّةِ هو الظَّاهِرُ، وههُنا اخْتَلَفَا في أهْلِيَّةِ التَّصَرُّفِ (٤٠)، وليس مع من يَدَّعِى الأَهْلِيَّةَ ظَاهِرٌ يَسْتَنِدُ إليه، ولا أصْلٌ يَرْجِعُ إليه، فلا تَرْجُحُ دَعْوَاهُ. والحُكْمُ في مَن عُرِفَ له حَالُ جُنُونٍ، كالحُكْمِ في الصَّبِىِّ، وإن لم يُعْرَفْ له حالُ جُنُونٍ، فالقولُ قولُ المَضْمُونِ له؛ لأنَّ الأصْلَ عَدَمُهُ، فأما المَحْجُورُ عليه لِفَلَسٍ، فيَصِحُّ ضَمَانُه، ويُتْبَعُ به بعدَ فَكِّ الحَجْرِ عنه؛ لأنَّه من أَهْلِ التَّصَرُّفِ، والحَجْرُ عليه في مَالِه، لا في ذِمَّتِه، فأشْبَهَ الرَّاهِنَ، فصَحَّ تَصَرُّفُه فيما عدا الرَّهْنِ، فهو كما لو اقْتَرَضَ أو أَقَرَّ أو اشْتَرَى في ذِمَّتِه. ولا يَصِحُّ ضَمَانُ العَبْدِ بغير إِذْنِ سَيِّدِه، سواءٌ كان مَأْذُونًا له في التِّجَارَةِ أو غيرَ مَأْذُونٍ له. وبهذا قال ابنُ أبي لَيْلَى، والثَّوْرِىُّ، وأبو حنيفةَ. ويَحْتَمِلُ أن يَصِحَّ، ويُتْبَعَ به (٤١) بعدَ العِتْقِ. وهو أحَدُ الوَجْهَيْنِ لأصْحابِ الشَّافِعِىِّ؛ لأنَّه من أهْلِ التَّصَرُّفِ، فصَحَّ تَصَرُّفُه بما لا ضَرَرَ على السَّيِّدِ فيه، كالإِقْرَارِ بالإِتْلَافِ. ووَجْهُ الأَوَّلِ، أنَّه عَقْدٌ تَضَمَّنَ إِيجابَ مالٍ، فلم يَصِحَّ بغيرِ إِذْنٍ، كالنِّكَاحِ. وقال
(٣٩) في الأصل، أ، م: "أهمية".(٤٠) في م: "الصرف".(٤١) سقط من: أ.