in the context of the hadith, when he informed him of the payment: "Now you have cooled his skin." Guarantee differs from transfer (hawala); for the guarantee (daman) is derived from the word for binding (damm), and thus it necessitates binding between the two liabilities in terms of the right being attached to both and established in both. The transfer (hawala) is derived from transformation (tahawwul), and thus it necessitates the transformation of the right from its location to the liability of the transferee (muhal 'alayhi). Regarding their statement that a single debt cannot reside in two locations, we say: It is permissible for it to be attached to two locations by way of corroboration, like the attachment of the debt of a pledge (rahn) to it and to the liability of the pledger (rahin). Abu Bakr 'Abd al-'Aziz said: As for the living person, he is not absolved by mere guarantee, according to a single narration. As for the deceased, there are two narrations regarding his absolution by mere guarantee; the first is that he is absolved by mere guarantee. Ahmad stated this in the narration of Yusuf ibn Musa, due to the two reports we mentioned, and because the benefit of the guarantee in his case is the absolution of his liability; thus, this benefit should be realized by mere guarantee, unlike the living person, for the intended purpose of the guarantee in his case is corroboration of the right, and its establishment in both liabilities is more emphatic in corroboration. The second is that he is not absolved except by payment, due to what we have mentioned, and because it is a guarantee, so the debtor is not absolved by it, just like the living person.

Section: The creditor has the right to demand payment from whichever of the two he wishes. It was narrated from Malik, in one of two reports from him, that he does not demand payment from the guarantor unless it becomes impossible to demand it from the debtor; this is because it is a form of documentation, so the right is not satisfied from it except when satisfaction from the principal is impossible, like a pledge. Our argument is that the right is established in the liability of the guarantor, so he has the right to demand it, like the principal; and because the right is established in both their liabilities, he has the right to demand it from whichever of the two he wishes, like [the case of] two guarantors if it is impossible to demand it from the debtor. It does not resemble a pledge, because the pledge is the property of the one who owes the right, and it is not a legal entity (dhimma) that can be sued; rather, the one who owes the debt is sued so that he may pay from it or from elsewhere.